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i 
ABSTRACT 
 
Since the burst of the internet bubble there is a great deal of interest in the way 
investment bank prices and allocates initial public offerings (IPOs). The additional 
scrutiny and spotlight is also because of the dominance of bookbuilding mechanism, 
which gives complete discretion in terms of allocation and pricing to underwriters, and 
the huge amount of money left on the table by the issuers, especially during the internet 
bubble period. Numerous press stories and law suit by investors and issuers alleged 
conflicts of interest by investment banks at the expense of issuers and investors. On the 
basis of scoping study we identified five areas to examine conflicts of interest: 
laddering, spinning, relationship banking, profit sharing allocation and allocation to 
affiliated funds.  
The findings of the systematic review show that very limited research has been done on 
the areas identified.  Moreover, there is almost no evidence available to examine the 
behaviour of investment banks post internet bubble burst. Likewise, very limited 
evidence is available from countries other than United States. From whatever limited 
research has been done in these areas there does seem to be enough evidence to suggest 
that investment banks have been involved in activities that is in conflict with their 
responsibilities and duties. There is clear evidence of wrong doing by investment banks 
in US during the internet bubble period by being involved in spinning, laddering and 
profit sharing allocations. There is not much evidence available at the moment to charge 
the underwriters of exploiting issuers and investors through the use of affiliated banks, 
venture capitalists and mutual funds. There is a great need to examine the behaviour of 
investment banks not only for the sake of the stability of the financial markets but also 
for the financial intermediaries themselves as unnecessary regulations undermine the 
efficient operations of financial markets.         
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
One of the primary sources of funds for firms to grow and prosper is an Initial Public 
Offering (IPO). IPOs are also regarded as the primary determinant of venture capital 
financing which were instrumental in fostering the tremendous growth of firms such 
as Microsoft, Compaq, Oracle, and Sun Microsystems (Jeng and Wells, 2000). Black 
and Gilson (1998) state that the potential for exit through an IPO allows the 
entrepreneur and the venture capitalist to contract implicitly over control which is not 
easily possible through bank financing. On a more general note, IPOs helps to divert 
savings from consumption to long-term investment and when state-owned enterprises 
are converted into share-holding companies their management and operations become 
market-driven and market-responsive.  
The initial public offering process is fairly complicated. It involves a complex inter-
relationship between the advising, marketing, pricing, and trading functions (Ellis et 
al., 1999). There are three main players involved in the process: the issuer, the 
underwriter and the investor. The first time issuer, generally considered to be naïve in 
the process, leaves it to the underwriter to decide on the price and allocation of shares. 
In cases of firm commitment underwriting, the underwriter guarantees proceeds to the 
issuer and receives the gross spread (difference between the amount paid to issuer and 
the amount at which the issue is sold to the investors). The underwriter discretionally, 
as in bookbuilding, allocates shares to the investor once it decides on the price and the 
number of shares to be offered. Investors are classified as either institutional or retail. 
Figure 1 depicts a simplified IPO process. For an excellent explanation of the IPO 
process see Ellis et al., (1999).    
The most discussed topic in IPOs, both in academics and in practice, is underpricing. 
Underpricing refers to the difference between the offer price and the price the stock 
fetches on the first day of trading. It reflects the amount of money left by the issuer on 
the table. There is extensive evidence of underpricing in almost all the markets and 
across time (Ritter,  2003). Coupled with this is the emergence of book building as the 
most popular share allocation mechanism throughout the world. Book building has 
been the most widely used mechanism in US for quite some time now and it is now 
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becoming the dominant allocating mechanism in other countries. Bookbuilding gives 
underwriter complete discretion in determining the offer price and allocating shares to 
the investor.  
 
Figure 1: IPO Process 
If the underwriter has no other sources of profits than gross spread it will make no 
sense for the underwriter to sub-optimize the offering price. This will lead the 
underwriter and issuer to work towards the same goal (Kojima, 2007). However, 
research has shown that underwriters do derive profits from underpricing, either 
directly or indirectly (Loughran and Ritter, 2002; Ritter and Zhang, 2007). Thus, the 
additional sources of profit for the underwriter creates potential for conflict of interest 
between the issuer and underwriter.  
Conflicts of interest for the investment bank arise not only with the issuer but also 
with investors. These have led some academicians to refer IPO process as a web of 
conflicts (Dalton et al., 2003). It is not only the investment banks which are exposed 
to conflicts on interest in the IPO process; issuers are also exposed to and/or 
perpetuate conflicts of interest. There is some academic research which analyses 
conflicts of interest between managers (venture capital funds) of IPO firms and other 
shareholders. The objective of this systematic review, however, is to review the 
theoretical and empirical evidence of various manifestations of conflicts of interest 
and its impact on the IPO process that an investment bank is exposed to.   
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1.2 The Need to Investigate Conflicts of Interest 
Conflicts of interest have generated tremendous interest among academicians and 
researchers in the aftermath of dot com crash and has further accentuated due to a 
number of high profile scandal and cases in the recent past notably the failure of 
Enron, Parmalat and WorldCom among others. In the context of this heightened 
interest in conflicts of interest, Mehran and Stulz, (2007) posit some very important 
and pertinent questions: 
• Have the mechanisms that control conflict of interest in market 
economies fail to do so in financial institutions? 
• If these mechanisms fail, does it mean that the conflicts of interest 
affect the prices at which securities trade? 
• What is the efficiency of primary and capital markets? 
• Is welfare of customers of financial institutions protected? 
• Does diversification of activities within financial institutions make 
conflicts of interest worse or better? 
• Have legal and regulatory attempts to affect the impact of conflicts of 
interest made the customers of financial institutions better or worse 
off? 
• Do these efforts have unintended consequences that make capital 
markets less efficient and less competitive?  
My investigation of Initial Public offerings is motivated by some of these questions. 
The role of investment banks has come under increased scrutiny in the aftermath of 
dotcom. The dotcom crash, which was preceded by unprecedented levels of 
underpricing, has firmly put the spotlight on the investment banks with allegation of 
exploitation of conflict of interest at the expense of issuers and investors. With global 
IPO activity again reaching pre dotcom crash levels and the huge surge of IPO 
volumes in markets other than US (as shown in fig 2), there can be no better time to 
investigate conflicts of interest in some other financial centres of the world.   
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Figure 2: Global IPO Activity IPO & IPO Activity in BRIC Countries                                         
Investigation of conflicts of interest is important for issuers, investors, financial 
markets and not the least investment banks. With the development in technology and 
opening up of a number of new markets, such as the alternative investment market in 
London, more and more small investors and entrepreneurs are coming to the market 
like never before. This has contributed to the rise of retail investors and relatively 
young and small issuers in financial markets in the recent times. However, 
information asymmetries are magnified with retail investors/ small issuers as they do 
not possess the scale or economies to gather or collect information (Mehran and Stulz, 
2007). It therefore becomes important to investigate the role of financial 
intermediaries in their relationships with these investors and issuers. Empirical 
evidences have shown that there are concerns that need to be addressed for the 
efficient and smooth functioning of financial markets (Ber et. al, 2001; Reuter, 2006; 
Ritter and Zhang, 2007).  
The mere presence of conflict of interest entails significant costs to financial 
intermediaries likes investment banks. Rational investors discount the offer price 
when they believe conflicts of interest exist which imposes costs on financial 
institutions (Mehran and Stulz, 2007). If an institution is able to avoid conflicts of 
interest or establish that conflicts of interest will not affect its actions in a way that is 
costly to its customers, it will then be able to sell its products and services at a higher 
price (Mehran and Stulz, 2007). Reputational capital matters tremendously to 
financial intermediaries. An erosion of this capital will not only bring about negative 
consequences for the company, but for the overall economy as a whole. Thus, it 
becomes important to correctly analyse and evaluate the role financial intermediaries 
such as investment banks play to improve the operation of the financial markets.    
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The responsibility for the smooth operation of the financial markets falls on the 
regulators. One course of action that these regulators can take is to impose rules and 
regulations in the operation of the financial intermediaries to minimize or avoid 
conflicts of interest. In the US, NASD has published proposal for changing conflict of 
interest rules relating to underwriting of public offerings (Gittleman and Sacks, 2006). 
However, relying on rules and regulations rather than on the forces of free market can 
make financial markets less efficient in pricing securities and allocating capital and 
ultimately reducing economic growth (Mehran and Stulz, 2007). Therefore, I believe 
it is the responsibility of the researchers to present empirical evidence of ground 
reality so that regulators undertake (or not undertake) appropriate action which is 
neither detrimental to the issuers or investors nor interferes with the smooth 
functioning of the financial markets.  
1.3 Review Objectives 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) have been regarded as a web of conflicts of interest 
(Dalton et al., 2003). As such there are number aspects in IPOs that have been 
investigated by academicians to examine conflicts of interest. Some papers have 
looked in to conflict of interest between pre-IPO shareholders and the decision makers 
(Ljungqvist and Wilhelm, 2003). A large volume of literature analyses the conflict of 
interest as a result of sell-side analysis by analyst employed by underwriters 
(Michaely and Womack, 1999).  It, therefore, will be impossible to look into all the 
areas in IPOs which has implications for conflicts of interest. The scoping study done 
earlier contributed to this and has helped in identifying the areas that I am interested 
in. I will focus only on those conflicts of interest which have the potential to be 
perpetuated/exploited by investments banks and which could occur from the  
beginning of the IPO process (after the underwriter is selected) until the end of the 
quiet period (the period after which underwriter is allowed to make stock 
recommendations). This will mean I will not look into conflict of interest that arises 
from analyst recommendations which occurs after the end of the quiet period or 
conflicts of interest between pre-IPO shareholders and the decision makers as they 
neither involve investment banks nor occur during the time period I have focussed on. 
Scoping study helped me identify activities of investment banks during an IPO which 
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could lead to conflicts of interest and be within the framework discussed above. These 
activities have been listed below in table 1 with their brief description.  
The specific objectives of the review are: 
• What evidence is available of the various types of conflicts of interest 
perpetuated by investment banks in the initial public offering process? 
• What is the impact of such conflicts of interest on the degree of underpricing 
and share allocations?  
• What research tools/techniques, methodologies and proxies have been used to 
uncover such conflicts of interest? 
• Is the nature of such conflicts of interests in different in different markets such 
as US and Europe and/or Developed and Emerging Markets?  
Activities potentially leading 
to conflicts of interest 
Description 
Laddering Underwriter allocates shares to those who are willing to buy 
more shares once it starts trading 
Spinning Underwriter allocates shares to issuing firm executives/ VC 
&/or to other investors to attract future underwriting 
business  
Commission based Allocations Underwriter allocates hot IPOs to those investors who direct 
IPO profits as commission back to underwriters.  
Allocation to Affiliated Funds Underwriter allocates either hot or cold IPOs to its affiliated 
funds to improve fund performance or improve/maintain 
underwriting business 
Relationship banking Using private information commercial banks who are 
underwriters allocate overpriced IPOs to investors 
Table 1: Research areas identified from scoping study 
The rest of the review paper is divided into four chapters. Chapter two introduces the 
relevant theoretical background from the initial public offer literature. Chapter three 
presents the methodology for conducting the review and includes search and quality 
appraisal criteria. Chapter four presents the findings from the systematic review 
process. Finally, chapter five concludes the review and identifies potential research 
directions. 
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2 Chapter Two: Theoretical Background 
2.1 Conflict of Interest 
The definition of conflict of interest itself has attracted a lot of academic rigour with 
argument and counter argument with respect to its scope. Some academicians have 
provided narrow and specific definitions while others have put forward all 
encompassing, comprehensive definitions.  
According to Boatright (Boatright, 2000) conflict of interest exists “when a personal 
or institutional interest interferes with the ability of an individual or institution to act 
in the interest of another party, when the individual or institution has an ethical or 
legal obligation to act in that other party’s interest”.  
 
 (Carson, 1994) provides a comprehensive definition of conflict of interest: 
 
“Conflict of interest exists in any situation in which an individual (I) has difficulty 
discharging the official (conventional/fiduciary) duties attaching to a position or 
office she holds because either: (i) there is (or I believes that there is) an actual or 
potential conflict between her own personal interests and the interests of the party 
(P) to whom she owes those duties, or (ii) I has a desire to promote (or thwart) the 
interests of (X) (where X is an entity which has interests) and there is (or I believes 
that there is) an actual or potential conflict between promoting (or thwarting) X’s 
interests and the interests of P.” 
 
The key elements of the above definition of conflict of interest are: 
(a) It is not necessary that “I” fails in discharging his fiduciary duties; difficulty in 
discharging the duties would constitute conflict of interest.   
(b) There is no need for the actual conflict of interest to exist to create conflict of 
interest. If “I” believes the existence of conflict of interest it would tantamount 
to conflict of interest and it would hinder his performance of the duties of her 
position. 
(c)  Conflict of interest arises when a person works for a client. There will be no 
conflict of interest if the person works for himself.  
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For the purpose of this research I will use the following definition: “ ....conflict of 
interest as a situation in which a party to a transaction can potentially gain by taking 
actions that adversely affect its counterparty” (Mehran and Stulz, 2007).  
Boatright (1999) presents a comprehensive description of conflicts of interest: types 
of conflicts of interest, sources of conflicts of interest and strategies to manage 
conflicts of interest. He creates taxonomy of the different types of conflicts of interest 
with regards to the financial services firms. He distinguishes conflict of interest into 
three categories: (a) actual and potential conflict of interest, (b) personal and 
impersonal conflict of interest and (c) individual or organizational conflict of interest. 
Financial instruments, financial markets, advisory & management services, and 
organizational governance are considered as sources of the conflicts of interest. His 
strategies to manage conflicts include competition, disclosure, rules and policies, and 
structural changes.  
Hayward and Boeker (1998), Boatright, J. R. (2000), Crockett et al., (2003), Walter 
(2004), Mehran and Stulz (2007) and, Palazzo and Rethel (2007) are some of the 
papers that provide interesting descriptions of conflicts of interest in the context of 
financial intermediaries such as investment banks.  
2.2 Initial Public Offerings 
There a huge volume of literature available on Initial Public Offerings (IPOs). 
Researchers over the years have examined a number of different issues surrounding 
IPOs. Both the theoretical and empirical IPO literature has become highly 
sophisticated. A discussion on any topic on IPOs should provide an introduction to the 
various theories of underpricing and long term performance, pricing and allocation at 
the very least. In this section we will present a discussion on the various theories that 
have relevance to the issue concerning conflicts of interest perpetuated by investment 
banks.   
2.2.1 Theories on initial performance (underpricing) of IPOs 
Underpricing of IPOs has been focus of numerous academic papers since it was first 
observed in the early 1970s. Stoll and Curley (1970), Reilly (1973), Logue (1973) and  
Ibbotson (1975) were the first to document underpricing in financial literature (Ritter 
and Welch, 2002). It is a ubiquitous phenomenon and has persisted across time and 
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countries. The degree of underpricing, however, has fluctuated over time prompting 
researchers and academicians to come up with different theories to explain it. Ritter 
and Welch, (2002), Ritter (2003) and Ljungqvist (2007) provide excellent reviews on 
underpricing theories. Figure 3 shows underpricing in a number of developed and 
emerging markets.  
Theories on initial performance of IPOs can be grouped under two categories: those 
that assume information asymmetry between participants and those that do not 
assume information asymmetry (Ritter and Welch, 2002). 
2.2.1.1 Underpricing theories based on Information asymmetry 
There are three parties to an initial public offering: issuer, investment bank 
(underwriter) and the investor. Underpricing theories based on information 
asymmetry assume one of the parties to have superior information than the other 
parties. These theories regard underpricing a result of this information asymmetry. 
The most well known theory which assumes investors to be more informed than 
others is the one propounded by Rock (1986). The theory assumes that there are two 
groups of investors: informed and uninformed and that the continued participation of 
the uninformed group is essential for the successful completion of IPOs. Rock (1986) 
argues that underpricing is essential for the continued participation of uninformed 
investors. In absence of (expected) underpricing uninformed investor will not 
Figure 3: Underpricing in developed and emerging markets 
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participate because of winner’s curse problem: informed investors will crowd out the 
uninformed investors in case of underpriced IPOs and 100% allocation in case of 
overpriced issues. Koh and Walter (1989) provide a direct test of the rock model in 
Singapore and find that informed investors just broke even. Support for Rock’s 
theoretical argument was also found in UK by Levis (1990) and in Finland by 
Keloharju (1993). Michaely and Shaw (1994) argue and provide empirical evidence 
that with the reduction of heterogeneity in investors the need to underprice goes away.  
Presented first by Beatty and Ritter (1986) and empirically observed both through 
time and across countries is the link between ex ante uncertainty and degree of 
underpricing. It has been consistently shown that higher the ex ante uncertainty higher 
is the degree of underpricing. Most of the researchers explaining underpricing control 
for this uncertainty, the proxies of which fall in four groups: company characteristics, 
offering characteristics, prospectus disclosure and aftermarket variables (Ljungqvist, 
2007). Beatty and Ritter’s, (1986) claim that investment banks coerce issuers to 
underprice in order to attract the uninformed investors was empirically test by Nanda 
and Yun (1997) and Dunbar (2000). Nanda and Yun (1997) find that investment 
bank’s market share is negatively affected by overpricing and Dunbar (2000) supports 
the argument by empirically finding evidence of decreasing market share of those 
investment banks who either underprice or overprice too much.   
Since information asymmetry contributes to underpricing it was argued that 
underpricing can be reduced by taking measures to reduce information asymmetry. 
Hiring a reputable investment bank and/or auditor serves the purpose if reputation is 
valuable to the investment bank. Booth and Smith (1986), Carter and Manaster (1990) 
and Michaely and Shaw (1994) all examined the impact of a prestigious underwriter 
on the degree of underpricing. The relationship between the two variables has 
changed over time. While there was a negative relationship between prestigious 
underwriter and the degree of underpricing during the 1970s and 1980s, the sign has 
flipped during the 1990s. A number of explanations including the change in issuer 
objective (Loughran and Ritter, 2004), the lowering of the bank’s criteria for selecting 
firms to bring to the market and endogeniety issues (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) 
among others have been advanced to explain the change in the sign. 
Theories of underpricing which assume issuers to be better informed than others are 
also regarded as signalling theories because of the need of the issuers to signal the 
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quality of their firm. High quality firms need to distinguish themselves from low 
quality ones and underpricing becomes a very effective tool which the low quality 
firms cannot replicate. High quality issuers make sacrifice (underpricing) in the 
beginning and recoup their losses through better pricing when they come to the 
market for the second time. The major contributors to signalling theories are Allen 
and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989). The empirical 
evidence for signalling theories is relatively weak. Jegadeesh et al.,(1993) provide a 
direct test of the signalling model and find that aftermarket returns are as good 
predictors as the first day return for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Similarly, 
Michaely and Shaw (1994) find evidence which fails to link underpricing and the 
probability of SEOs. 
Theories of underpricing in which the investment banks are assumed to be better 
informed than others are also referred to as the principal agent model. The principal 
agent model has caught the attention of researchers following the burst of internet 
bubble (Ljungqvist, 2007). This approach is increasingly used to explain IPO 
allocation and pricing behaviour exhibited by the investment banks, especially during 
the internet bubble period (Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Baron and Holmstrom (1980) 
and Baron (1982) were the first to explore principal agent models in IPO literature. 
They argue that investment banks underprice IPOs because of their superior 
information and in doing so spend less effort in marketing and selling the product. 
Inconsistent with the prediction of the principal agent model, Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989) find that the underpricing of investment banks when they 
themselves go public is similar to those of other firms.   
2.2.1.2 Underpricing theories on pricing and allocation of IPOs 
Since I am interested in conflicts of interest perpetuated by investment banks which 
are primarily evident through pricing and allocation, it will be relevant to look at 
some of the IPO underpricing theories and empirical evidence which are based on 
pricing and allocation. Although some of the theories are based on information 
asymmetry, they are discussed here to underscore their importance to the topic I am 
interested in. The most important theory on IPO pricing and allocation is the one 
posited by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Their model is based on the book building 
mechanism of IPO allocation and extends Rock’s (1986) model of underpricing. They 
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argue that underpricing and more allocation is the reward to induce truthful revelation 
from its coalition of informed investors. Since the investment bank is a repeat player 
in the IPO market, it can exclude misleading investors while rewarding truthful 
investors. The reward for conveying favourable information to the investment bank is 
the preferential allocation of underpriced stocks. Thus underpricing is the equilibrium 
in which the true value of the firm is extracted from the informed investors. Since 
bookbuilding mechanism provides discretion to underwriters in terms of pricing and 
allocation, underwriters use it to extract favourable information from the investor 
which in turn reduces the average underpricing. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) and 
Spatt and Srivastava (1991) also contribute to the bookbuilding theory and posit that 
bookbuilding can be an effective tool to extract information from the investors. 
Sherman (2000), Sherman and Titman (2002) and Sherman (2005)  strongly support 
the bookbuilding mechanism and treat underpricing as an equilibrium.  
Arguments of the bookbuilding theory seem very plausible and appealing as long as 
underpricing is reasonable. There also has been some empirical evidence supporting 
the theory (Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001). However, it becomes less appealing and 
subject to criticism when underpricing reaches the levels as witnessed during 1999-
2000 in US and most other countries. The bookbuilding is seen by many as a 
mechanism to extract rent by the investment banks. The alternative view builds on the 
work of Baron (1982).  Loughran and Ritter (2002) propose the prospect theory as an 
alternative explanation for allocation and pricing of IPOs. They argue that 
entrepreneurs readily accept underpricing and fail to get upset with high underpricing 
because they tend to offset the wealth loss as a result of underpricing with the wealth 
gain on their shares as prices increase in the after-market.  
Some papers have compared bookbuilding mechanism with other mechanism such as 
auction. Biais et al., (2002) and Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) present theoretical 
models which replicate the benefits of bookbuilding, namely information extractions, 
without the cost attributable to bookbuilding mechanism. Empirically, Derrien and 
Womack (2003) and Kaneko and Pettway (2003) have provided evidences showing 
underpricing lower for IPOs issued through auctions than those issued through 
bookbuilding.  
Allocation between institutional and retail investors has been one of the issues that 
papers on allocation have investigated. Studies in both the US and UK have shown 
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that institutional investors are preferred over retail investors (Hanley and Wilhelm, 
1995; Aggarwal et al., 2002; Cornelli and Goldreich, 2001). While Hanley and 
Wilhelm, (1995) find underwriters being strategic in allocation of IPOs with higher 
allocation to institutional investors in both hot and cold IPOs, Aggarwal et al., (2002) 
on the other hand find evidence of institutional investor getting a larger share of the 
allocation in case of hot IPOs and lower allocation in case of weak IPOs. They argue 
that the allocation to institutional investors is in access of what is explained by the 
bookbuilding theories.  Moreover, Boehmer et al., (2006) find evidence that almost 
75% of the allocation in a particular IPO is made by the lead-underwriter.           
2.2.1.3 Some other explanations of IPO underpricing1 
The IPO underpricing literature is huge and it would be practically impossible to 
discuss all the theories that have been proposed to explain it. This section will discuss 
some of the other well received explanations of IPO underpricing. One explanation 
for underpricing comes from the law suit avoidance theory which posits that 
underpricing reduces the risk of being sued by investors (Tinic, 1988 & Hughes and 
Thakor, 1992). However, there is not much empirical support for the theory as 
underpricing is evident even in those countries where the risk of being sued is not 
economically significant (Lee et al., 1996; Jenkinson, 1990). Ruud, (1993) posited 
that it is the after-market price stabilization activities of the underwriter that lead to 
underpricing being observed. Ellis et al., (2000) find evidence of the underwriter 
being the most dominant market maker following the IPO.   
Some theories regard underpricing as a tool to retain control. Since underpriced IPOs 
are heavily subscribed, it allows the issuers/investment banks to allocate to a wide 
group of investors avoiding control by a large single investor (Brennan and Franks, 
1997). Booth and Chua (1996) on the other hand argue that dispersed ownership helps 
in maintaining a liquid market for the stocks while Zingales (1995) argues that a more 
dispersed ownership helps the pre-IPO shareholders to easily sell their shares in the 
aftermarket. Some behavioural explanations are also offered to explain underpricing. 
Welch's (1992) information cascade, Ljungqvist et al., (2006) investor sentiment 
theory and Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) prospect theory are examples of behavioural 
explanations to underpricing.  
                                                 
1 See Ljungqvist (2007) for detailed description. 
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2.2.2 Theories on long-term performance of IPOs 
Similar to initial underpricing, long-term performance of IPOs has also been 
researched heavily by the academicians.2 In addition to a number of papers explaining 
the causes of long term performance, the literature on long-term performance has also 
discussed on the measurement issues which has plagued almost all discussion that 
relates to long term performance. Most of the studies have documented long term 
poor performance of IPOs over the three-five year period subsequent to the IPO 
(Keloharju, 1993; Ritter, 1991; Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Aggarwal et al., 1993; 
Levis, 1995). One explanation of the long term poor performance of IPOs comes from 
those who attribute it to fads (Ritter, 1991 & Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990). Over 
optimistic investors buy IPOs expecting high returns, driving the initial price high, but 
subsequently sell their holding when those expectations are not met.  Another 
explanation of long term underperformance is provided by Schultz (2003) who argues 
that large number of IPOs follows successful IPOs. This group of IPOs which follows 
the large group and they do not perform as well as the successful IPOs as they tend to 
be overvalued by the investors. Since this group of IPOs normally occupies large 
portion of the sample, the IPOs in general show on average low returns in the long 
run. 
Jain and Kini (1994) argue that the poor long-term performance of IPOs can be partly 
explained by the decreasing ownership of managers immediately after the flotation. 
The decrease in managerial shareholdings following the IPO potentially leads to a 
worsening of managerial incentives. Jain and Kini (1994) find a positive link between 
operating performance and the proportion of shares retained by managers after the 
IPO. Mikkelson et al., (1997) record managerial ownership over the ten years 
following the IPO. Contrary to Jain and Kini (1994), they do not find any consistent 
relationship between performance and changes or levels of ownership at different 
points in time. Underwriter reputation has also been used to explain long term 
underperformance. Mikkelson et al., (1997) find that underwriter reputation can 
explain the long term performance of IPOs and show that prestigious underwriter 
were associated with poor long term performance and vice-versa. Brav and Gompers 
                                                 
2 See Ritter and Welch (2002) for a detailed discussion 
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(1997) show that IPOs backed by venture capital funds perform much better than 
those which are not.  
2.2.3 Venture Capital backed IPOs  
A significant number of IPOs which goes public is backed by venture capital funds. 
As a result of this a number of academic papers investigate the performance of 
venture backed IPOs. Venture capitalists not only provide financial and technical 
support to entrepreneurs. As venture capitalists are repeated players in the market they 
also provide certification and monitoring to IPOs which is valued highly by market 
participants. Early studies of venture backed IPOs were provided by Barry et al., 
(1990) and Megginson and Weiss (1991). Megginson and Weiss (1991) find the 
initial returns of venture backed IPOs lower than non-venture capital backed IPOs. 
They attribute the difference to the certification ability of venture capitalist in 
reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, they also find evidence of long-term 
relationship between venture capitalists and underwriters which lead to lowering of 
issuing costs. They also find that venture capitalists retain a large fraction of shares 
even after the IPO. Barry et al (1990) on the other hand focus on the monitoring role 
of venture capitalist. They find a negative relationship between the degree of 
underpricing and ownership, length of board service and number of venture capitalist 
involved in the firm.  
Gompers (1996) introduced the grandstanding hypothesis following an examination 
of young and mature venture capital funds. He finds that IPOs backed by young 
venture capital funds are younger at the time IPOs and are also more underpriced that 
those backed by mature venture capital funds. This is primarily because of the need of 
these young venture capital funds to establish reputation in the market and to seek 
funds to make further investments.  
While earlier studies on venture capital backed IPOs showed a negative relationship 
between underpricing and venture capital backing, the sign of the relationship flipped 
in some later studies. Both Francis and Hasan (2001) and Loughran and Ritter (2004) 
find evidence of higher underpricing associated with venture capital backing in the 
context of US. Hamao et al., (2000) find similar relationship in the context of Japan 
and Bessler and Kurth (2007) in the context of Germany.  
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The evidence of the impact of venture capital on the long term performance of IPOs is 
mixed. Brav and Gompers (1997) find better long term performance of venture 
backed IPOs and relate it to the sound management structures set up by the venture 
capitalists. Krishnan et al., (2006) also find evidence of superior long term 
performance of venture backed IPOs. They also study the impact of venture capital 
reputation on the performance of IPOs by using some new measures of underwriter 
reputation. The study finds that the market share of venture backed IPOs dominates 
other measure of underwriter reputation in explaining the long term performance. 
Hamao et al (2000) find the long term performance of venture backed IPOs no 
different from the performance of other IPOs. Bessler and Kurth (2007) also find 
similar result in the context of Germany.             
Lee and Wahal (2004) address the endogeniety issue associated with investigation of 
venture backed IPOs. They state that comparing venture backed IPOs and non-venture 
backed IPOs is not appropriate as venture capital funding is concentrated in a few 
industries and also in a few geographical areas. They also argue that the receipt of 
venture funding is an endogenous choice on the part of venture capitalist and the firm. 
After using measures to control for this endogeniety, the study finds higher initial 
returns for IPOs backed by venture capitalists and supports the grandstanding 
hypothesis.    
2.3 Integration of commercial bank into Investment Banking  
The integration of commercial banks with investment banks has been a contentious 
issue with policy makers in a number of countries (Kutsuna et al., 2007). The repeal 
of the Glass-Steagall act in the US in the late 1990s has also triggered additional 
interest in the issue. The proponents of universal banking point to the economies 
obtained in information production and therefore greater accessibility to capital 
markets. The opponents, however, argue that such integration gives great power to 
banks and that they are exposed to conflicts of interest. Such power could enable the 
banks to indulge in self-dealing and also gain bargaining power in client’s investment 
banking services (Kutsuna et al., 2007) .  
Banking relationship are very crucial to young budding firms. Without proper support 
from credit markets it is almost impossible for entrepreneurs to grow and develop. 
Moreover, such banking relationship also helps firms to be able to acquire funds 
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easily and at a lower cost. James and Wier, (1990) explains the relative benefits of 
banking relationship for firms considering an IPO. They find that the degree of 
underpricing is lower for firms with a bank lending relationship. Since IPOs are prone 
to asymmetry information, having banking relationship can help to ameliorate such 
asymmetry by providing certification. 
There are two main conflicts of interests in the context of universal banking: bank 
lending/underwriting conflicts and sell side analysis/underwriting conflicts (Johnson 
and Marietta-Westberg, 2005).       
2.3.1 Bank Lending/Underwriting Conflicts 
The concern of banks being involved in underwriting business is expressed by 
Benston (1990) and Saunders (1985). Since these banks have superior information 
and prior financial claims on the assets of the company, the major concern of these 
authors was the possibility of commercial banks to monopolize and drive out 
investment banks (Puri, 1999). To address these issues a number of studies 
investigating conflicts of interest in bank lending/underwriting relationship have been 
carried out. Most of these studies investigate the underwriting of bonds by 
commercial banks and have utilized data of both pre and post Glass-Steagall era. Ang 
and Richardson (1994) Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and Puri (1994) provide evidence 
from the pre Glass-Steagall era and Gande et al., (1997) from the modern era. 
Kroszner and Rajan (1994) examine two hypotheses: Naive Investor and Rational 
Discounting Hypothesis. The former posits that the underwriter of an IPO in which it 
has an equity stake is able to take advantage of the unsuspecting buyers while the later 
posits that the investors or buyers correctly anticipate the conflict of interest in these 
situations and therefore demand greater discounts in offer price.  
The paper didn’t find any support for the naive investor hypothesis and all evidences 
supported the rational discounting hypothesis. They find the quality of issues 
underwritten by commercial banks higher and the long term performance better than 
those issues underwritten by investment banks. Further, suspecting the lemons 
discounts demanded for low quality issues, commercial banks avoided issues which 
were information sensitive and focused on older, larger and better known firms. 
Further, the paper finds that the default rates of bond underwritten by commercial 
banks to be much lower than those issued by investment banks. Ang and Richardson 
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(1994) and Puri (1994) also find similar evidence for debt underwritten by 
commercial banks in the pre-Steagall era.  
Using post Glass-Steagall Puri (1996) and Gande et al., (1997) find similar evidence. 
Both the studies support the certification hypothesis and find that debt issues managed 
by commercial banks exhibits higher prices compared to debt managed by investment 
banks. Hebb and Fraser (2002) provide evidence from Canada after the removal of 
restrictions on chartered bank ownership of investment dealers. Using ex ante bond 
yield and equity price responses to bond issue as measures the paper finds no 
evidence supporting conflict of interest. In a highly citied paper Puri (1999) examines 
a number of issues when both commercial banks and investment banks underwrite 
issues. The paper finds that banks can be better certifiers than investment houses 
when banks lend to firms. However, if banks hold equity position their certification 
ability is hindered.   
2.3.2 Sell side Analysis/Underwriting Conflicts 
Michaely and Womack (1999) is one of the first papers that discuss conflicts on 
interest in the context of underwriter analyst recommendations. They investigate how 
underwriter analysts recommend stocks which were brought to the market by their 
firms. They find significant bias in the behaviour of underwriter analysts as stocks 
recommended by them perform poorly than buy recommendations by unaffiliated 
brokers prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date.  Lin and 
McNichols (1998) use seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) to evaluate the 
recommendation of underwriter analysts. They find evidence similar to Michaely and 
Womack (1999) as underwriter analyst release more favourable earnings forecast and 
stock recommendations than non-affiliated analysts. Bradley et al., (2003) examine 
the underwriter analyst recommendations after the expiration of the quiet period. 
Using data during the period 1996-2000 they find that analyst coverage is initiated for 
76% of the firms and mostly with a positive recommendation. Moreover, they find 
that firms with analyst coverage experience 4.1% abnormal return during the first 5 
days after the expiry of quiet period compared to an abnormal return of 0.1% for firms 
without analyst coverage. Agrawal and Chen (2004) also find results consistent with 
conflict of interest. They find forecasts made by underwriter analysts to be more 
frequent but less accurate than independent analysts. Ljungqvist et al., (2006) find that 
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while affiliated analyst do provide aggressive recommendations they do not influence 
the outcome of future investment bank business. Using comprehensive data from 
1993-2002, the paper finds that the main determinant in choosing investment banks is 
the strength of prior underwriting and lending relationships.   
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3 Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter presents the methodology for conducting the systematic review. Beginning with 
a rationale for conducting the systematic review and a list of members in the consultation 
group, the chapter then presents the systematic review protocol which includes the search 
strings, resources used, criteria for selecting studies and a quality appraisal tool.  
3.1 Rationale for Systematic Review 
Systematic review, which is extensively used in the field of medicine as an aid to evidence 
based decision making (Petticrew, 2001), is an extremely useful tool for analysing existing 
literature in a scientific way to identify key contributions and evidence on a particular issue. 
Petticrew (2001) dispels some of the myth surrounding the use of systematic reviews in areas 
other than randomised controlled trials. Systematic reviews are extremely useful in 
“identifying, appraising and summarizing the results of otherwise unmanageable quantities of 
research” (Mulrow, 1994). Systematic reviews involves rigour and is different from the 
traditional literature review in terms of transparency and reproducibility through explicit 
inclusion and exclusion criteria in selecting studies as well as clear quality appraisal criteria.  
Table 2 presents the systematic review process as presented in Tranfield et al., (2003). This 
chapter deals with stage 1 of the systematic review process. Phase 0 and Phase 1 of the first 
stage of the review process were dealt in an earlier paper presented as scoping study whereby 
I conducted a preliminary review of the conflicts of interest in IPOs perpetuated by 
investment banks and highlighted the need to conduct such a review. This part of the paper 
will deal with the development of a review protocol. Stage II and III is carried out in chapters 
four and five of this review.   
As mentioned in the scoping study, the aims of the systematic review are as follows: 
• What evidence is available of the various types of conflicts of interest perpetuated by 
investment banks in the initial public offering process? 
• What is the impact of such conflicts of interest on the degree of underpricing and 
share allocations?  
• What research tools/techniques, methodologies and proxies have been used to 
uncover such conflicts of interest? 
• Is the nature of such conflicts of interests different in different markets such as US 
and Europe and/or Developed and Emerging Markets?  
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Stage 1: Planning the Review 
• Phase 0: Identification of the need for a review 
• Phase 1 - Preparation of a proposal for a systematic review 
• Phase 2 - Development of a review protocol 
Stage II - Conducting the review  
• Phase 3 - Identification of research 
• Phase 4 - Selection of studies 
• Phase 5 - Study quality assessment 
• Phase 6 - Data extraction and monitoring progress 
• Phase 7 - Data synthesis 
Stage III - Reporting and dissemination  
• Phase 8 - The report and recommendations 
• Phase 9 - Getting evidence into practice     
Table 2: Stages of Systematic Review 
3.2 Systematic review protocol 
3.2.1 The Consultation Panel 
Table 3 presents the consultation panel for my reviews. Since it is impossible to get access to 
all the literature by myself, I relied on the expertise of my consultation panel to make sure 
that I didn’t miss out on some of the important papers that shape my field of study. The panel 
consists of a good mix of academicians and practitioners. This group will not only help me 
during the systematic review but throughout my PhD program. Professor Sunil Poshakwale 
has continuously encouraged and provided feedback throughout the systematic review 
process. Comments from other members of the panel have also been influential in shaping the 
systematic review. While Dr. David Denyer’s classes on the systematic review process 
helped me understand the fundamental principles of the process, Ms Heather Woodfield’s 
experience and guidance helped me to use and search journal databases in an effective and 
efficient manner.   
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3.2.2 Search Strategy 
In order to properly review an area of interest it is pertinent to develop a sound and robust 
search strategy. A sound search strategy helps in identifying and uncovering all the relevant 
and important literature. Such a strategy should include more than one mechanism so as to 
triangulate the results of a particular mechanism.  
3.2.2.1 Keyword Search 
Although conflict of interest is widespread in the IPO process and a number of academic 
papers have addressed it, the term “conflict of interest is not explicitly stated in a number of 
papers. In Hao’s (2007) article on Laddering, a conflict of interest theme which I am 
interested in, the term “conflict of interest” does appear even once throughout the paper. 
Therefore, it appears that simply combining the two terms, IPOs and conflicts of interest, will 
not yield the desired outcome. It becomes necessary to identify themes or construct 
synonymous to conflict of interest. Table 4 presents the keys words associated with the two 
themes of Initial Public Offerings and Conflict of Interest. The keywords were identified by 
an extensive search of the related literature and brainstorming with colleagues and faculties.  
    
Person Title/Organization Role 
Prof. Sunil 
Poshakwale 
Professor of Finance, Cranfield School of 
Management 
Supervisor 
Prof. Sudi 
Sudarsanam 
Professor of Finance, Cranfield School of 
Management 
Advisor & Member of 
Panel 
Prof. Krishna 
Paudyal 
Professor of Finance, Durham Business 
School, University of Durham 
External Advisor 
Dr. Bhaskar Das 
Gupta 
Chairman and Managing Director, Strategy 
and  Architecture, ABN Ambro Group 
Practitioner & External 
Advisor 
Dr. Vineet Agarwal Research Fellow Internal Advisor 
Ms. Emma Parry Research Fellow Systematic review expert 
Dr. Ranko Jelic Reader, Birmingham University External Advisor 
Dr. Joakim 
Westerholm 
Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Finance and 
Economics, University of Sydney, Australia 
External Advisor 
Dr Radha Shiwakoti Lecturer in Accounting, Kent Business 
School, University of Kent 
External Advisor 
Heather Woodfield Social Sciences Information Specialist Literature Search 
Advisor 
Table 3: Consultation Panel for Systematic Review 
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Area  
Initial Public Offerings Initial Public Offering*; IPO*, “Going Public”;  
Conflicts of Interest (Laddering); (Spinning); (“Affiliated Fund*”, Allocation*, 
Distribution*); (“Relationship Bank*”, “Universal Bank*”, 
“Banking Relationship*, “Commercial Bank*”),  (“Brokerage 
Commission*”, “Affiliate* Fund*”, “Mutual Fund*”) 
Table 4: Key Words 
Table 5 presents the search strings to locate studies that I am interested in. Wildcards such as 
“*” are used to take into account the various forms of the words.  One search string is used 
for each of the theme identified. This includes the search words related to the theme and 
Initial Public offerings. The rationale for doing so is to make sure that search is able to locate 
all the studies related to the theme with the Initial Public offering at its context.   
Area Search String Rationale 
General 
(‘Conflict* of Interest*” OR 
Manipulation*) AND (“Initial Public 
Offering*” OR IPO* OR “Going Public”) 
To identify if I have missed some other 
conflicts of Interest in the Initial Public 
Offerings related to Investment Banks 
Laddering 
Laddering AND (“Initial Public 
Offering*” OR IPO* OR “Going Public”) 
To locate all the papers related to 
Laddering in IPOs 
Spinning 
Spinning AND (“Initial Public Offering*” 
OR IPO* OR “Going Public”) 
To locate all the papers related to 
spinning in IPOs 
Relationship 
Banking 
(“Relationship Bank*” OR “Universal 
Bank*” OR “Bank* Relationship*” OR 
“Commercial* Bank*”) AND (“Initial 
Public Offering*” OR IPO* OR “Going 
Public”) 
To locate all the papers related to 
relationship banking in IPOs 
Profit Sharing 
Allocation 
(Allocation* OR Distribution* OR 
Brokerage Commission*) AND (“Initial 
Public Offering*” OR IPO* OR “Going 
Public”) 
To locate all the papers related to profit 
sharing allocation in IPOs 
Allocations to 
Affiliated Funds 
(“Affiliate* fund*” OR “Mutual fund*”) 
AND (“Initial Public Offering*” OR IPO* 
OR “Going Public”) AND (Allocation* 
OR Distribution*) 
To locate all the papers related to 
allocations to affiliated funds in IPOs 
Table 5: Search Strings 
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3.2.3 Resources 
3.2.3.1 Databases 
The database to search strings described above is presented in Table 6. Since these are very 
new themes for research I have include as many relevant databases as possible to locate 
relevant studies.  
 Database Description 
EBSCO Business Premier The world’s largest full text business database; 
full text for 2,950+ scholarly business journals; 
Comprehensive full text coverage for regional 
business publications (75+) 
ABI/INFORM Global Provides 1,000 premier worldwide business 
periodicals for wide range of information. 
Science Direct Over 1,700 journals from Elsevier Science; Over 
three million articles and over 59 million 
abstracts from all fields of science. 
Scopus 15,000 peer reviewed journals from more than 
4,000 publishers.  
Emerald  Publish the world's widest range of management 
journals 
Social Science Citation Index Provide journal papers with cited reference and 
authors abstract (1981-) and proceedings (1990-) 
Wiley Inter-Science Journals Online content service delivering the full text of 
over 300 leading journals, plus major reference 
works, the full text of select Wiley print books. 
Wiley Inter-Science Journals Online content service delivering the full text of 
over 300 leading journals.  
Table 6: Databases  
3.2.3.2 Other Sources 
Besides the databases described above I have also searched for papers in some other sources. 
Since this is an emerging area there might be a lot of work being currently done and as such a 
review of working papers, conference proceedings is extremely important to make sure that I 
have access to the current debates and empirical evidence of the issue that I am investigating. 
Other sources include: 
• Social Science Research Network (SSRN eLibrary): The network lists working papers 
of academicians and has a separate Financial Economics network directed by Micheal 
C Jensen of Harvard Business school.  
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• Google Scholar: Google scholar will also be used to locate studies. Results from 
Google Scholar are usually very large because of the lack of search filters. It will 
primarily be used to check if the databases have failed to locate some studies.  
• Conference Proceedings: Papers from conferences related to IPOs will be reviewed as 
well. Although they might be less rigorous than journal papers, they do help to 
identify current work being carried out.   
• Websites of Academicians/Experts: the webpage of Jay Ritter not only provides his 
latest working papers but also quite a huge collection of IPO data. I will therefore visit 
the webpages of prominent writers on IPOs to see their current working papers. A 
preliminary list of such academicians include Jay Ritter (University of Florida), Tim 
Jenkinson (Said Business School), François  Derrien (Rotman), Alexander Ljungqvist 
(Stern Business School), Manju Puri (Fuqua Business School), etc. 
3.2.4 Selection Criteria 
The searches using the various search strings discussed above will, inevitably, produce a 
large number of papers. The task will then be to include relevant papers and exclude the 
irrelevant ones. The first stage of this process will include and exclude papers based on their 
abstract. Papers selected through abstract analysis will then be analysed further in much more 
detail to ascertain whether they should be excluded or included in the review.  
3.2.4.1 Selection Criteria for Abstracts 
Table 7 shows the inclusion criteria for papers’ abstracts. It is important to develop sound 
criteria to make sure that all the relevant papers are included.  
 
Criteria Variables Rationale 
Topic IPOs, Investment Bank, 
Conflicts of Interest 
The aim of my review is to include papers that are 
related to conflicts of interest related to IPOs and 
perpetuated by Investment Banks. Therefore, 
conflict of interest perpetuated by other players of 
the IPO process will be excluded. Similarly, 
conflicts of interest that arise due to issuance of 
securities other than IPOs (for e.g. debt) will also be 
excluded.  
Time Period Until the end of Quiet Period The review will include all those conflict of interest 
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as explained by the above criteria which arises 
before the end of the quiet period of the IPO 
process. My review will therefore exclude conflicts 
of interest that arise from analyst recommendations.  
Academic and 
Scholarly 
Journals 
Peer reviewed Journal, 
working papers, conference 
proceedings 
The review will include paper from peer reviewed 
journals, workings papers and conference 
proceedings. As highlighted above, the need to 
include working papers and conference proceedings, 
although they are not as rigorous as peer reviewed 
journals, arise from the fact that academic work on 
this area has begun only recently due to the paucity 
of data.  
Working Papers Old Working Papers Old working papers, those prior to 2000, will be 
excluded from the review.  
Geographic 
regions 
All geographic regions The review will include papers from all geographic 
regions as one of the aims of the review is to 
identify difference in the nature of conflicts of 
interest in different regions.  
Approach Empirical & Theoretical The review will include both empirical and 
theoretical papers. Theoretical papers provide useful 
guidance as to where empirical evidence is lacking. 
Table 7: Selection Criteria for Papers' Abstract 
3.2.4.2 Selection criteria for full Papers 
Once the papers are selected from abstract, a second selection criteria will be used to finally 
select papers for assessment of the quality (the next phase) and to be subsequently included in 
the review. The second selection criterion is presented in Table 8. 
3.2.5 Quality Appraisal 
Having selected papers using the selection criteria mentioned above the next task is to 
evaluate the quality of the papers. Papers which do meet these quality standards will then 
finally be included in the review. Based on a review of earlier systematic reviews I have 
identified the following criteria for evaluating the quality of the papers: Theoretical 
Background, Methodological rigour, Data Analysis, Contribution to Knowledge, Limitations 
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and potential for future research. Table 9 presents the Quality Appraisal tool for the selected 
full papers.  
 
Table 8: Selection Criteria for Full Papers 
Theoretical/Conceptual Papers must contain: 
• Discussion of the relevant theoretical background and the link of the model developed to 
these theories  
• A clear statement of the assumptions used for developing the models 
• Clear definitions and explanations of the variables, parameters and equations used in the 
model 
• Explicit proofs of the most important results and theorems. 
• A discussion about the limitations of the model 
• Examples of real events or empirical evidence supporting the results of the model(s) 
Empirical Papers must contain: 
• Clear link of the empirical work with existing theories and/or previous empirical works 
• Clear description of sample used in terms of time period, context, sector, etc and its validity 
for generating conclusions.  
• Definitions and explanations of the variables used in the study 
• Clear explanation of an appropriate methodology employed with an explanation of its 
advantages and limitations 
• Results in line with the aims of the research; Clear presentation of results  
• Clear statement of the contribution of the research to the current understanding of the field. 
Whether the study confirms current beliefs about the issue or does it uncover new 
paradigms 
• Based on the findings of the study a statement on the potential areas for further research 
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Elements to Consider 
Level 
0-Low or Absence 1- Medium 2- High 
Not 
Applicable 
Theoretical Background 
Very little or no description of 
theoretical background 
Basic review of the theoretical 
foundations; summary of empirical 
papers; 
Excellent review of the theoretical foundations; clear 
link of the theory with the research question; excellent 
summary of prior empirical work 
NA 
Methodological Rigour 
Weak methodology applied or 
there is no explanation of the 
methodology applied 
Justified research design; acceptable 
methodology to develop the papers 
idea 
Clear link of the methodology applied to the research 
issue and theoretical argument; relevant proxies used; 
NA 
Data Analysis 
Not enough information to 
assess this criteria 
Appropriate data sample; results are 
relevant for understanding the  aim of 
the paper 
Adequate data sample, Use of highly relevant statistical 
tools and techniques;   
NA 
Contribution to 
Knowledge 
Little or no theoretical or 
empirical contribution 
Reasonable contribution to existing 
knowledge 
Significant addition to the current understanding of the 
issue(s) 
NA 
Limitations and 
Potential for future 
research 
Not enough information to 
assess this criteria 
Limitations stated but does not 
explain its relevance to understand 
the results; future research areas not 
stated 
Limitation of the study explicitly stated and clearly 
understood; provides areas for further research that can 
enhance understanding 
NA 
Table 9: Quality Assessment Tool for Full Papers 
A paper will not be selected if it scores 0 in three or more categories.  
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3.2.6 Data Extraction 
Table 10 shows the data extraction form that was used to extract data from the papers 
selected for the review.  
Citation Information 
Author  
Title  
Publication  
Author/s Affiliation  
Date of Publication  
Volume  
Issue  
Page number  
Context  
Database  
Key Words  
Study Background 
Empirical or Theoretical  
Quantitative or Qualitative  
Model Employed  
Sample Size  
Data Frequency  
Year Range  
Data Description  
Theme Context 
Conflict of Interest Theme Laddering or Spinning or Profit Sharing Allocations 
Country US; UK; France; Japan 
Market 
(Developed/Emerging) 
Developed; Emerging 
Quality Assessment 
Theoretical Background  
Methodological Rigour  
Data Analysis  
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Contribution to Knowledge  
Limitations and Potential 
for future research 
 
Thematic Information  
Abstract  
Key Findings  
Potential Research Areas  
Table 10: Data Extraction Sheet 
3.2.7 Cross Referencing 
One important source of relevant papers is through cross-referencing. The papers 
identified through the selection and quality appraisal criteria will also be used to 
identify relevant papers from its references. This is a very popular and effective 
source of locating studies. Since study of conflicts of interest perpetuated by 
investment banks have gained momentum in the recent years, a high quality recent 
paper will help to locate studies that might have been missed through the earlier 
described search criteria. The papers thus identified will go though the same selection 
and quality appraisal criteria described above.  
3.2.8 Data Synthesis 
The data extracted from the extraction form will then be used to produce a coherent 
synthesis. Extraction of data from the papers will mean nothing if they are not 
systematically and coherently organized and analysed so as to produce a meaningful 
summary of the papers identified and analysed. I will organize and summarize all the 
papers identified on the basis of the four themes that I have identified during the 
scoping study. This will not only help me to have a clear understanding of the 
theoretical debates and empirical findings but also will lend me an opportunity to 
identify research questions to be addressed during my PhD.  
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4 Chapter Four: Findings 
This chapter presents the results of the systematic review process following the methodology 
elaborated in the earlier chapter. The first part of the chapter will present the results of the 
literature search and the papers selected for final review. The second part of the chapter will 
provide a detailed analysis of the papers selected for review which will be followed by a 
synthesis. 
4.1 Description of the Findings 
4.1.1 Search and Selection of Studies 
The first step in the search and selection of studies was to obtain results from the journal 
database utilising the search strings developed. The results of those searches and the process 
through which the final reviewed papers are selected in presented in a summary format in 
Table 11. The final list of papers to be reviewed was selected through a very rigorous 
process. The results from the database search using the search strings were initially screened 
from the title of the paper. The list of papers thus selected were then subjected to the selection 
criteria as mentioned in 5.1 in the methodology section. Thorough examination of the abstract 
helped to identify the papers most relevant to the objective of this review.  
There were some very interesting observations during the search process. Keywords did 
throw up a large number of studies. A closer examination of these papers, however, revealed 
that a large number of the papers didn’t address the issues that I am interested in. The most 
remarkable result came from the searches related to spinning. While ABI and EBSCO did 
produce a large number of results none of the papers involved a discussion about the conflict 
of interest perpetuated by investment banks. A majority of the papers dealt with equity carve-
out and spinning carried out by parent firms. The only two papers which addressed conflicts 
of interest came through cross referencing. The papers identified from the general theme were 
ignored as all of those papers were identified in one or the other conflict of interest themes.   
Twenty three papers were selected from the abstract analysis process, which were then 
subjected to quality appraisal criteria as mentioned in section 5.2. The result of the process 
yielded twenty papers while three papers were discarded for not meeting the required quality 
standards. During the systematic review process a number of key papers were identified 
through cross references and SSRN searches. These papers, most of them working papers,
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ABI/INFORM Global 386 31 13 1 1 1 0 0 337 4 4 0 532 24 12 8 2002 121 30 1 82 3 1 0 3340 184 60 10 
EBSCO 110 32 12 3 26 3 3 2 86 3 3 0 753 76 31 8 1391 143 24 6 21 5 5 3 2387 262 78 22 
Science Direct 4 4 1 0 2 2 0 0 4 4 4 0 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 17 17 9 4 
Scopus 10 10 0 0 2 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 14 14 0 0 17 17 5 1 2 2 0 0 46 46 5 1 
Emerald 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 39 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 39 39 7 0 
Social Science 
Citation Index 
111 111 3 1 5 5 3 2 0 0 0 0 8 8 2 2 111 111 8 0 4 4 1 0 239 239 17 5 
Wiley Inter-Science 
Journals 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Papers from Database 0 2 0 14 4 3 23 
Papers Selected after 
Quality Criteria 0 2 0 11 4 3 20 
From Cross 
Ref./SSRN/Websites/
Google Scholar 
0 1 2 1 2 1 7 
Total No. of Papers 
to be Reviewed 0 3 2 12 6 4 27 
Table 11: Summary of search and selection process 
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were in fact very key to get updated to the current debate concerning conflicts of interest in 
initial public offerings. There were seven additional papers obtained through this process 
which were then included to the final list of papers to be reviewed. Quality appraisal 
standards were also applied to these seven papers. Two of the papers were shared by two 
different areas.  
4.1.2 Description of Papers selected for Review   
This section presents description of the papers selected for final review. Table 12 shows the 
distribution of studies according to research categories. Most of the studies are empirical. 
Some of the empirical papers, however, do have theoretical models which are then tested 
with secondary data. One survey paper has also been included published in a high ranking 
finance journal. Table 13 shows the distribution of studies according to information sources. 
While most of the studies come from published journal articles, a number of key working 
papers have also been included to ensure that the current debates on the topic have not been 
ignored.    
 
Empirical Theoretical Survey Total 
Theme/Research Category Papers % Papers % Papers % Papers % 
Laddering 2 67% 1 33% 0 0% 3 100% 
Spinning 2 100% 0 0% 0 0% 2 100% 
Relationship Banking 11 92% 1 8% 0 0% 12 100% 
Profit Sharing Allocation 5 71% 1 14% 1 14% 7 100% 
Allocation to Affiliated funds 4 100% 0 0% 0 0% 4 100% 
Total 24 86% 3 11% 1 4% 28 100% 
Table 12: Distribution of studies according to research category 
 
Published Papers Working Papers Total 
Theme/Research Category Papers % Papers % Papers % 
Laddering 2 67% 1 33% 3 100% 
Spinning 1 50% 1 50% 2 100% 
Relationship Banking 11 92% 1 8% 12 100% 
Profit Sharing Allocation 6 86% 1 14% 7 100% 
Allocation to Affiliated funds 3 75% 1 25% 4 100% 
Total 23 82% 5 18% 28 100% 
Table 13: Distribution of studies according to information sources 
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Figure 4 shows the distribution of the selected papers over time. Most of the papers selected 
are quite recent reflecting the recent surge in interest on the topic. There are very few studies 
which have addresses the issues prior to 2004. Figure 5 shows the distribution of studies by 
geographic location where the empirical study was carried out. Most of the studies have been 
carried out in the United States with very few studies documenting conflicts of interest in 
Initial public offerings outside the US. There is literally no evidence from the emerging 
markets. There is only one paper that documents the conflict of interest in United Kingdom, 
which however dates back to 1999 using data of even prior period. The Israeli evidence 
comes from a single paper which examines both relationship banking and allocation to 
affiliated funds. Table 14 shows the distribution of published papers by journal. A large 
number of studies are selected from two of the most reputed journals in finance literature: 
Journal of Financial Economics and Journal of Finance. The two journals account for almost 
40% of the papers selected. 
While there is relatively a larger body of evidence on relationship banking, the other areas 
have been less chartered by academicians and researchers. The fact that about fifty percent of 
the papers selected have come from this field means that a great deal of work needs to be 
done before we have a clear understanding about the issue both in developed and emerging 
markets. A large number of paper selected in this review have been published only after 2004 
which shows that the topic has certainly created an interest among researchers in recent 
times. In fact it was in 2007 when the largest number of papers were written and published on 
the themes that I have selected for the review. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of studies by time 
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Figure 5: Distribution of Empirical Papers by country/region 
 
Journals Laddering Spinning 
Relationship 
Banking 
Profit 
Sharing 
Allocation 
Allocation 
to affiliated 
Funds 
Total 
Journal of Financial Economics 2     1 1 4 
Journal of Finance    1 3 1 5 
Review of Financial Studies      1   1 
Journal of Money Credit and Banking    1     1 
Financial Management  1       1 
Journal of Banking & Finance    1     1 
Journal of Monetary Economics    1   1 2 
Journal of Law & Economics    1     1 
Academy of Management Journal    1     1 
Pacific basin finance journal    1     1 
Venture Capital    1     1 
Annals of Finance      1   1 
European Journal of Finance    1     1 
Applied Financial Economics    1     1 
The Financial Review    1     1 
Total 2 1 11 6 3 23 
Table 14: Distribution of published papers by Journal 
A number of interesting observations can be deduced from the descriptive analysis. First, 
there are relatively few number of studies documenting the conflicts of interest perpetuated 
by investment banks for the nature conflict which the review seek to explore. Second, apart 
from the United States, empirical evidence is almost non-existence even for developed 
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countries like United Kingdom which has a very active IPO market. Third, there are no 
papers which explore such issues in developing markets like India, China, and Russia which 
have been in the forefront of the IPO market for quite considerable time now.    
4.2 Data Extraction and Synthesis 
This section of the chapter will explore in detail the papers selected for the review. Each 
research category is examined separately in sub-sections. Each section is then concluded by a 
summary of the findings, debates and potential research gaps.  
4.2.1 Laddering 
One source of conflicts of interest for investment banks in laddering. Laddering refers to the 
effort of the investment banks to motivate clients to buy IPO shares in the first days of trade 
by promising preferential treatment in share allocation of the current IPO or future IPOs in 
order to make the IPO a bigger success (Rethal and Palazzo, 2007). Increased demand in the 
aftermarket increases the degree of underpricing and conveys the message of the IPO being a 
huge success leading to increased reputation of the underwriter(s) involved.  The customers 
who enter into such agreements with the underwriter are called ladderers. A number of major 
investment bankers have settled cases with SEC in the United States in which laddering 
allegedly occurred3.  
The number of research papers which have addressed laddering is relatively few. My search 
reveals that only two published papers have examined laddering and there is one unpublished 
working paper which examines laddering during the internet bubble period. A summary of 
these three papers is shown in Table 15.  
Hao (2007) presents a theoretical model of laddering and its implications in initial returns, 
long term performance and allocations of IPOs among a number of other issues. The paper 
builds economic models related to laddering to derive empirical prediction and examines 
them in the light of empirical evidence. More specifically, it explores the driving forces 
behind laddering and the effect of laddering on IPO pricing. The paper posits that greater 
                                                 
3 J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs agreed to pay $25 million, $40 million, and $40 million 
respectively, to settle accusations of laddering. J.P. Morgan also agreed to pay $425 million to settle a class 
action lawsuit that alleged all of the major IPO underwriters engaged in laddering, profit sharing, and biased 
analyst coverage for more than 300 IPOs during 1998-2000 (Hao, 2007a). 
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laddering is induced through higher expected intrinsic underpricing and information 
momentum. Laddering increases the offer price, the aftermarket price and the amount of 
S.N Study C’try 
Data 
Period 
Evidence Underpricing 
Long term 
Performance 
1 Hao 
(2007)  
N/A Theoret-
ical 
Paper 
Laddering used by underwriters 
to support themselves and 
investors. Although offer prices 
increases with laddering, 
negative correlation of the 
initial returns with long term 
stock performance. 
Underwriters benefits through 
aftermarket stock price support.  
N/A N/A 
2 Griffen 
et, al. 
(2007)  
United 
States 
1997-
2002 
Laddering by bookrunner 
clients. Net 8.79% purchasing 
by book runner clients 
immediately after the IPO. No 
such trading seen through other 
members of the syndicate. 
In case of underpriced 
IPOs, 50% of the 
increase in price on the 
first day attributed to 
laddering.  
No significant impact of 
laddering on long term 
performance as 
suggested by Hao 
(2007) 
3 Aggarwa
l et al., 
(2005) 
United 
States 
1998-
2000 
Tie-in agreements explains a 
significant portion of the 
variation seen the underpricing 
during the bubble period. 
Underpricing of sued 
IPOs 7 times higher 
than those of non-sued 
IPOs. Trading volume 
15 times higher. 
Continue to earn 
higher return five 
months after the IPO. 
Significantly poor 
performance compared 
to non-sued IPOs. 
Comparatively poor 
performance seen 
during the lock up 
expiration period 
indicating cashing out 
by insiders. 
Table 15: Summary of Papers on Laddering 
money left in the table. However, the net increase in the underpricing is ambiguous as it 
depends in the relative increase in the offer price and the aftermarket price. As a result of the 
increase in short term returns, laddering contributes to a negative relationship between long 
term and short term performance. Finally, when the underwriters collude with the investors in 
rent seeking behaviour in underpriced IPOs, laddering provides additional value to the 
underwriters. The empirical implications as pointed out in this paper do signal that laddering 
involves conflicts of interest on the part of the underwriter. Although on some occasions 
laddering may lead to improved offer prices, there are several other issues that are harmful 
for the issuers, not least the negative correlation between initial and long term returns which 
could be very much detrimental to the issuer if it plans to come back to the capital market 
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sometime in the future. All 21 IPOs with first day returns of more than 300% or more since 
1980 have dropped by more than 90% from their first day close to their 3 year anniversary 
with only one exception. 
While Hao (2007) presents theoretical framework for explaining laddering, Griffin et al., 
(2007) provide empirical support. The paper uses a sample of 1,294 IPOs listed on the 
Nasdaq during the period 1997-2002 and merges it with the Nasdaq clearing data for the first 
21 days of trading for each IPO.  The paper explores the net purchase trading behaviour of 
bookrunner’s (lead underwriter) investor client immediately after the IPO. They find that 
during the period 1997-2002, book runner client bought an amount equal to 20.64% of the 
shares issued while they sold only 11.85% and thus creating a net buy imbalance of 8.79%. 
They propose four different hypothesis to explain such behaviour: (a) demand from long term 
investors (long-term shareholders); (b) superior execution quality of the bookrunner 
(execution quality), (c) clients of bookrunner have strong demand for IPO share (clientele), 
and (d) laddering by investors (laddering). The paper also investigates the impact of this 
trading behaviour on the IPO prices.  
Both the univariate and multi-variate results favour laddering hypothesis over the others. 
Consistent with the laddering hypothesis, the paper finds strong purchase through bookrunner 
in case of cold IPOs just above the offer price. Moreover, net buy demand is much stronger to 
those investment banks which issue many IPOs. Large institutional selling over the four 
subsequent quarters by book runner buying clients goes against the long term shareholder 
hypothesis and indicates a desire to fulfil short term commitments. The execution quality of 
these trades (book runner trading) are in fact worse than those offered by other members of 
the syndicate. This signals rent seeking on the part of the investment banks. As evidence 
against the clientele hypothesis, investors are large net buyers when their brokerage house is 
the bookrunner but are small net sellers when the same brokerage house is just a member of 
the IPO syndicate. Most of the laddering activity occurs in the first 30 minutes of IPO 
trading. This trading behaviour accounts for almost 50% of the first day price increase in case 
of underpriced IPOs. However, the activity of bookrunner client does not have much impact 
on the price of IPOs that goes down on the first day of trading. The paper does not find any 
evidence linking the first day buying behaviour and the long term performance of IPOs. 
Although laddering does seem to benefit the issuers through increase in aftermarket prices 
(and therefore tolerate underpricing), the paper stress the need to better understand the quid 
pro quo relationship between the underwriter and its client.      
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Using lawsuits as a proxy for tie-in-agreements between the underwriters and investor, 
Aggarwal et al., (2005) explore the impact of such agreements on underpricing, long-term 
performance and how underwriters seek benefit out of it. Their sample comprises of 904 
IPOs during the period 1999-2000. Out of 904 IPOs, 144 were sued by regulators and 249 
sued by the public (class action lawsuits). Sued firms accounts for 34% of the total proceeds 
raised by IPOs during the sample period. The paper uses suing as the proxy for tie in 
agreement between the underwriter and the investor. Results from the paper show that the 
degree of underpricing for sued IPOs is much higher than non-sued IPOs. In fact the initial 
underpricing of non-sued IPOs is comparable to pre-bubble periods (17.26%). Compared to 
non-sued IPOs, the mean IPO that is sued by the regulator has 7 times higher initial returns 
and has a first day trading volume which is 15 times higher. Moreover, the sued IPOs 
continue to earn higher returns compared to non-sued IPOs until the expiration of the lock up 
period. Post the lock-up expiration period the sued IPOs underperform compared to non-sued 
IPOs over the subsequent 2 years. Results show that such tie in agreements help insiders who 
cash out at the end of the lock up expiration period. While the sued IPOs perform much better 
than the non-sued IPOs during the build up to the lockup expiration period, the performance 
of these IPOs in the five day window surrounding the lock up expiration is -5.62% as 
compared to -1.66% for non-sued IPOs. This might be because of the huge selling on the part 
of the insiders at the first possible opportunity. The authors suggest that tie-in agreements 
explain most of the variation seen in underpricing during the internet bubble period. 
One obvious problem that can be noted from the above two empirical papers is the 
availability of data. Both the papers have utilized proxies. And probably this could be one of 
the reason as to why there are so few studies documents laddering in IPOs. However, as Hao 
(2007) shows laddering does have a number of negative impact on the efficiency of the 
capital markets and/or on issuers and therefore has to be investigated and evidence brought to 
light. Whatever little evidence is available points to the fact that laddering might used by 
investment banks to their own benefit at the expense of issuers. This can at least be said of 
the US during the internet bubble period. However, a number of issues remain outstanding. 
While there remains no doubt of the impact of laddering on underpricing, the impact of 
laddering on long term performance can at best be considered ambiguous.  Griffen et. al. 
(2007) find no impact of laddering on long term IPO performance while Aggarwal et al., 
(2005) show that IPOs with tie in agreements perform poorly compared to IPOs without tie in 
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agreements. As is the case with other research categories there is no research paper that 
documents laddering outside the US.    
4.2.2 Spinning 
Spinning refers to the practice of allocating hot IPOs by underwriters to managers and 
executives of the issuing firms or to other influential clients in order to get their future IPO 
deals. Spinning is done to influence the decision of the issuers in their choice of underwriters 
and/or the pricing of their initial public offerings (Liu and Ritter, 2007).Liu and Ritter (2007) 
regard it as a form of bribery paid by investment banks to the top executives of its clients. In 
financial literature there are only two paper which addresses spinning in great length.  
The first use of spinning as an explanation for IPO underpricing was by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004). Using comprehensive data from 1980-2003 comprising of 6,391 IPOs, the 
paper examines why underpricing changed over time and evaluates three non-mutually 
exclusive hypotheses: the changing risk composition, realignment of interest and changing 
issuer objective (incorporating the analyst lust and spinning hypothesis). In this very highly 
cited paper the authors introduce “spinning and analyst lust” hypothesis to explain the very 
high initial returns observed during the internet bubble period. The hypothesis predicts that 
IPOs underwritten by top-tier underwriters to be more underpriced because of the need of the 
issuers of having high ranked analyst and also because of the ability of these underwriters to 
allocate hot IPOs (spinning) to executive and decision makers of the issuing firms. Using 
reputation of the underwriter as a proxy for changing issuer objective hypothesis, the authors 
find that top-tier underwriters are associated with more underpricing, especially during the 
internet bubble period. The authors argue that this exhibits the desire of the decision makers 
of the issuing firms to put up with higher underpricing because of the side payments and the 
positive analyst coverage received.    
While Loughran & Ritter (2004) provide indirect measure of spinning, Liu and Ritter (2007) 
provide first clear evidence of spinning by investment banks and its effect on the level of 
underpricing and on future investment banking mandates. Using actual spinning data of 56 
IPOs brought to the market by three investment banks (Credit Suisse First Boston, Dutch 
Morgan Grenfell, and Salomon Smith Barney) during the period 1996-2000 the authors find 
initial returns of IPOs in which the executives were spun almost 18% higher than other IPOs. 
They also find that spinning to be negatively related to the probability of switching 
underwriters between the IPO and the first SEO. 31% of the issuers switched underwriters 
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when there was no case of spinning, while only 5% of the issuers switched underwriters 
whose executives were being spun. These results bring to light the effect of spinning. It 
proved beneficial to the underwriters and the decision makers of the issuing firms. The 
original shareholders of the firm are, however, at loss because of lower IPO proceeds and 
dilution of the value of their holdings.  
Spinning was banned in the US in April 2003 was banned as part of the landmark $1.4 billion 
global settlement with major Wall Street firms by the SEC. A number of court cases on 
spinning have resulted in the beneficiaries agreeing to disgorging large amount of money4. 
Spinning is clearly harmful to the integrity of the financial markets and harms the investors. 
Following the revelations of spinning in the US, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
carried out its own investigation in 2005 on spinning (and laddering) but didn’t find any 
evidence5.  
There is, however, no paper that deals with spinning from any other country. Because of 
increased scrutiny spinning is probably no more practiced. There is, however, a need to 
investigate both in the past and in other countries where the rules on spinning are not 
imposed.   
4.2.3 Relationship Banking 
The theoretical background in chapter two presented the debate in universal banking. It also 
explained the various hypothesis tested by researchers. My search shows that there are two 
types of relationship that are investigated in the context of IPOs. One strand of research looks 
at pre-IPO commercial banks affiliations with investment bank and the second strand 
explores the relationships of venture capital funds affiliated to investment banks. Both of the 
relationships are quite similar in the sense that these relationships can be exploited by the 
issuing investment banks to pursue its own objectives at the expense of the issuer. A 
summary of the papers selected for review for the banking relationship theme is presented in 
Table 16. The discussion will start with a theoretical paper and will be followed by discussion 
on universal banking focussing on commercial banks and venture capital funds separately.  
                                                 
4 For example Clark McLeod, the former Chairman and CEO of McLeodUSA, agreed to disgorge $4.4 million 
(source: New York State Attorney General ) 
5 The Times, London, UK. Jan 26, 2005 page number 47 
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 Study Country 
Data 
Period 
Evidence of 
conflict Underpricing Long-term Performance 
1 Kanatas and Qi, (1998) 
Theoretical 
Paper N/A 
Under certain conditions having regulatory separation beneficial. Under certain conditions reputation can mitigate the need to regulations 
 
2 Ber et al., (2001) Israel 1991-1994 No 
Statistically insignificant results for any evidence of conflict 
of interest. 
Long term operating performance provides evidence 
of certification hypothesis and a case for flow of 
information for better results. 
3 Hebb, (2002) United States 1995-1998 No 
Underpricing lower in commercial bank IPOs--Certification 
hypothesis N/A 
4 
Beneda and 
Kwon 
(2004) 
United States 1995-1998 N/A 
Underpricing reduced significantly after the entry of 
commercial banks in underwriting business. Does not tackle 
the issue of conflict of interest. 
N/A 
5 Schenone, (2004) United States 1998-2000 No 
Underpricing much lower for firms with pre-IPO banking 
relationship than firms without. N/A 
6 Kutsuna et al., (2007) Japan 1995-1999 No 
No significant difference between the two groups of IPOs. 
Total issue costs (direct + underpricing) again very 
comparable between 2 groups.  
No significant difference between the two groups of 
IPOs.  
7 
Gompers 
and Lerner, 
(1999) 
United States 1972-1992 Mixed 
VC backed IPOs Underpriced higher (Rational 
Discounting). Market participants anticipate conflicts of 
interest and demand higher discounts on offer price. 
VC backed IPOs perform no worse & may perform 
better than non-VC backed IPOs. 
8 Espenlaub et al., (1999) 
United 
Kingdom 1992-1995 No 
Underpricing lower for VC backed IPOs affiliated with 
potential sponsor/UW. UP of IPOs VC backed IPOs 
affiliated to actual UW higher. 
VC backed IPOs affiliated to UW perform much 
better than independent IPOs. 
9 Hamao et al., (2000) Japan 1989-1995 Mixed Evidence 
Underpricing higher when VC firm is also the lead manager 
indicating conflict of interest and demanding a higher 
discount 
Not significantly different from zero. Certification 
hypothesis which contrasts with the results of 
underpricing. 
10 Bessler and Kurth (2007) Germany 1998-2001 Mixed 
Underpricing of underwriter affiliated venture capital 
backed IPOs much higher than non affiliated IPOs. Investor 
demand higher discounts anticipating conflict of interest. 
No influence of conflict of interest on the long term 
performance of IPOs.  
11 
Li and 
Masulis 
(2004) 
United States 1993-2000 
No (Clear evidence 
of certification 
hypothesis) 
Reduced underpricing when shareholding UW is the lead or 
non-lead underwriter. Shareholding underwriter charges 
lower underwriting fees. 
 
The relationship between shareholding UW and either 
the delisting or the Tobin Q measure is no statistically 
significant. 
 
12 Arthurs et al.,(2008) United States 1990-1994 Yes 
Previous tie of the VC of an IPOs with the underwriter leads 
to higher underpricing. Internal boards members better than 
external board members (VC) for monitoring purposes. 
N/A 
Table 16: Summary of the Papers selected for Relationship Banking 
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4.2.3.1 Pre-IPO Commercial Bank Relationships 
Using a theoretical model Kanatas and Qi (1998) examines if a mandated separation of 
banking and underwriting function is economically useful taking the informational 
scope economies and conflict of interest into consideration. The authors argue that 
while there are savings in information production by having the same financial 
intermediary as the lender and underwriter, it also entails significant conflict of interest 
as the intermediary could issue shares of a poor firm to repay outstanding loans. They 
show that under certain conditions, which increase social cost, it is beneficial to have a 
regulatory separation of lending and underwriting business. Such conditions include 
firm's investment in poor quality projects which may lead to greater likelihood of runs 
on banks with greater asset risk or possibly to the opportunity cost of not funding 
productive investments. The paper also interacts with the reputation variable to examine 
whether it leads the universal banks to mitigate conflicts of interest. The authors show 
that regulation will not be necessary and that the financial intermediaries will mitigate 
the conflict of interest through reputation formation when three conditions are met: 
large scope economies, significant costs in underinvestment and a small discount factor. 
Using unique Israeli IPO data, Ber et al. (2001) utilizes both short term underpricing 
and long run operating performance measures to investigate conflicts of interest. A 
robust analysis using long-run operating performance (net profit and some other 
measures) shows that there is no conflict of interest in universal banking. In fact post-
IPO accounting profitability suggests that the combination of bank lending and 
underwriting yields better informed underwriting. The post IPO stock performance, 
however, is quite different. IPOs of firm with a bank underwriter exhibit negative first 
day returns and negative excess one year return and are different from the returns of 
IPOs without bank underwriter. Thus, to conclude whether conflict of interest exists 
depends on the definition of performance. Using accounting numbers does not indicate 
conflict of interest while using stock returns does.  
Hebb (2002) examines the initial performance of 431industrial IPOs issued in the US 
during the period Jan 1995-Dec 1998. The sample consists of 222 IPOs issued by 
commercial banks and 209 by independent investment banks. The main objective of the 
paper is to examine whether commercial bank underwritten IPOs have lower 
underpricing compared to investment bank underwritten ones. Results show that IPOs 
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in which one of the underwriters had a previous banking relationship with the firm have 
significantly less underpricing supporting the certification hypothesis. Results are 
similar when only commercial bank lead underwriters are used providing further 
support to the hypothesis.  The authors argue that the relaxation of the firewalls seem to 
have been interpreted by the market as allowing more information flow from the 
commercial bank to its underwriting subsidiary and therefore beneficial to the investors, 
contrary to the conflict of interest hypothesis. However, most of the IPOs which are 
issued by investment banks have refinancing/repaying bank loans as the major uses of 
funds. It could be that firms intending to use the funds to replace a bank loan wished to 
avoid the perception of a conflict of interest and chose an investment bank underwriter 
to issue it IPOs. This may well undermine the conclusions derived from the results.   
Beneda and Kwon (2004) do not investigate conflict of interest. Rather they examine 
the impact of commercial bank's entry in to the underwriting business on the degree of 
underpricing and underwriting fees. Using a sample of 1085 IPOs issued in the US over 
the period 1995-1998, the study shows that the degree of underpricing decreased 
significantly (from 23% to 17.4%) after commercial bank’s entry in to the underwriting 
business lending further support to universal banking. However, there is no change in 
the underwriting fees charged by the investment banks. The authors state that a possible 
reason for the decrease in the underpricing may be due to pro-competitive impact 
whereby the entry of commercial banks might have forced other underwriters to issue at 
higher prices. Increased competition means that underwriters will have to accommodate 
the interests of the issuers above their own therefore mitigating conflicts of interest.  
Using US data over the period 1998-2000 Schenone, (2004) examines the impact of 
pre-IPO banking relationship on underpricing. The study also distinguishes between 
lending (lending relationship) and underwriting (underwriting relationship) prior 
banking relationship. These is because the lending bank lends it money to the firm (and 
therefore generate more information) which is not in the case of underwriting bank. 
Moreover, prior banking relationships are separated into two groups: prior banks which 
could have managed it or not. The ‘could have managed’ group was further divided into 
two groups: banks which did manage and which didn't manage. In univariate results the 
mean underpricing for firms that went public with another firm, although they had 
relationship with a potential underwriter, is 32.91 % lower than mean underpricing of 
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firm that didn't have a choice of going public with their relationship bank. Similarly, the 
mean underpricing is 37.08% lower when the firms went public with their relationship 
bank than those who didn't have a choice to go public with their relationship bank. 
Multivariate results show that underpricing is lower by 17% for those IPOs which had a 
prior banking relationship with a potential underwriter. Moreover, underpricing is lower 
by about 16-17% when the prior banking relationship is lending relationship while the 
impact is much lower in the context of prior underwriting relationship.  
The author proposes two hypothesises to explain the observed differences in 
underpricing between the two groups of underwriters. Since lending underwriters have a 
stake in the firms they continuously monitor the firms operations and performance 
which is not the case in an underwriting relationship. Such monitoring leads to greater 
information production which is then revealed to the market at the time of IPO. 
Availability of greater information to market participants leads to lower underpricing. 
Data from the study also show that prior underwriting relationships are able to lock-in 
their clients more than prior lending relationships. The author suggests that if 
underwriter extracts some part of its rent through underpriced shares (quid pro quo 
relationships with investors) it will underprice more. This could be one of the reason 
why underpricing is more in case of a prior underwriting relationship compared to prior 
lending relationship. 
Kutsuna et al., (2007) provide evidence from Japan. Using IPO data during the period 
of financial stress (1995-1999) and using 321 IPOs the paper explores conflicts of 
interest in the universal banking framework by examining factors such as total issue 
costs, underpricing, aftermarket performance and use of proceeds. On all accounts they 
paper does not find any evidence of conflict of interest. Issues costs of both groups of 
IPOs are similar, no evidence of self dealing on the part of the commercial banks. Since 
larger issuers are able to switch to non-related investment banks, the degree of 
underpricing again is very similar. Relationship banking in fact proved to very good for 
the small issuers as they find greater access to equity capital markets. 
Most of the papers that have explored universal banking in the context of pre-IPO 
banking relationship do find evidence of conflict of interest mirroring the results of 
studies of debt underwriting (Puri, 1996, Kronzer and Rajan, 1994). The conclusion is 
derived primarily from lower underpricing observed in IPOs which are managed by 
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commercial bank underwriters. Some of the papers have also used other measures such 
as accounting returns and issuance costs. The support is for the certification hypothesis 
which posits that information asymmetry decreases as commercial banks certify the 
issues.   
4.2.3.2 Venture Capital Relationships   
In a very highly cited paper Gompers and Lerner (1999) replicate the universal 
banking debate setting in the context of venture capital backed IPOs where the venture 
capital fund is affiliated to the underwriter (lead or co-manager). Since venture capital 
funds will have similar information to those possessed by lenders to firms, the paper 
investigates whether rational discounting or naive investor hypothesis holds true in such 
cases. It also investigates whether the market anticipates such conflicts of interest by 
observing market reactions. The sample consists of 856 IPOs which are backed by an 
venture capital fund over the period 1972-1992. Venture capital funds in 386 out of the 
856 IPOs are affiliated to an investment bank and 127 of them are actually brought to 
the market by the affiliated lead or co-manager.   
Results show that IPOs in which underwriter hold prior venture investments perform no 
worse and may actually perform better (with some performance measures) in the long 
run than other IPOs. This means that actual or potential conflicts of interest do not have 
any impact on the long run performance of IPOs. Initial returns (underpricing) support 
the rational discounting hypothesis as the degree of underpricing for such IPOs were 
much higher compared to IPOs which didn’t have underwriter affiliated venture capital 
funds. The authors refer to this result to argue for universal banking as market 
participants understand potential problem and adjust accordingly. Results also that 
investment banks are sensitive to potential conflicts of interest as IPOs by firms in 
which underwriters are also venture investor appear to be more common for firms in 
which asymmetric information is less of a problem. Reputation of VC is positively 
related to performance, although the results are marginally significant. More important 
is the underwriter reputation: firms taken public with higher quality underwriter perform 
better in the long run. Higher quality underwriter appears to be concerned about the 
negative consequences to their reputation of overpriced issues. This lends support to the 
certification hypothesis.   
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Using UK data over the period 1992-1995 Espenlaub et al. (1999) conduct a similar 
study. The study examines whether there is conflict of interest or certification where 
investment houses are affiliated to VC backed IPOs. Their interpretation of 
underpricing is different from Gompers and Lerner (1999). While Gompers and Lerner 
(1999) interpret lower underpricing as evidence of ‘naive investor hypothesis’, 
Espenlaub et al. (1999) interpret it as evidence of certification hypothesis. In terms of 
long term performance, the result of the study is similar to that of Gompers and Lerner 
(1999) as no evidence of conflict of interest is found. Long term performance of VC 
IPOs where the VC is affiliated to an investment house is much better than the 
performance of IPOs backed by independent VCs. Moreover, long term performance is 
also positively related to the reputation of the venture capital backers. Again similar to 
the results of Gompers and Lerner (1999), initial returns of IPOs backed by underwriter 
affiliated VC is much higher than the IPOs backed by independent VCs. This can also 
be interpreted as investors requiring greater discount in the light of potential conflict of 
interest. The interpretation is further supported by the result that the degree of 
underpricing is not as high for those IPOs where the affiliated investment bank didn’t 
actually bring the issue to the market.  
Hamao et al. (2000) present evidence from Japan of both long term and initial returns 
of investment bank affiliated venture capital backed IPOs. Using a sample of 355 IPOs 
during the period 1989-1994 the paper presents evidence very similar to that of 
Gompers and Lerner (1999). The performance of underwriter affiliated venture capital 
backed IPOs do not performance differently from the IPO backed by an independent 
venture capital. Thus, potential conflicts of interest do not have any impact on the long 
term performance of IPOs. The initial returns of affiliated IPOs are, however, 
significantly higher than independent IPOs suggesting that the market demands great 
discount anticipant potential conflicts of interest.  
Bessler and Kurth (2007) provide evidence from Germany using a sample of 307 IPOs 
during the period 1998-2001from the Neuer market. Results here also mirror those of 
Gompers and Lerner (1999). Initial returns of IPOs for both bank affiliated venture 
capital backed IPOs and underwriter affiliated venture backed IPOs are significantly 
higher than those IPOs which are backed by independent venture capital funds. No 
difference in long term performance in found between the two groups of IPOs.   
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A working paper by Li and Masulis (2004) using data during the period 1993-2000 
find somewhat different results to those presented by Gompers and Lerner (1999). 
Using a sample of 1480 venture capital back IPOs they examine three different 
hypotheses in a situation where the VC is also the underwriter of the issuing firm: 
certification hypothesis, alignment hypothesis and investor conflict of interest 
hypothesis. Moreover they distinguish IPOs in which the VC is either a lead underwriter 
or a non-lead underwriter and also where IPOs have high or low information 
asymmetry. The three hypotheses are examined in terms of the relationship between 
underwriter shareholdings and revisions in IPO offer price and underwriter 
shareholdings and underwriting fees (gross spread). The hypotheses are also 
investigated using three and five year long run performance of IPOs using delisting as a 
measure of performance and also using market to book ratios. The underwriter’s 
shareholding in IPOs significantly reduces underpricing and the evidence is stronger 
when the underwriter is the lead underwriter. The authors argue this as a support for the 
certification and alignment hypothesis. Moreover, results show that the reduction in 
underpricing is higher when there is more information asymmetry. When shareholding 
underwriter is the lead, and to a lesser degree a non-lead underwriter, the offer price 
revisions are smaller from the midpoints and so are the absolute values of these 
revisions. This is again consistent with the certification hypothesis. In terms of 
underwriting fees, the lead shareholding underwriter charges lower fees and is 
concentrated in high information asymmetry IPOs consistent with the certification 
hypothesis. The lack of significant relationship between shareholding underwriter and 
either the delisting or the book to market value ratios leads to a rejection of the conflict 
of interest hypothesis.     
Finally, Arthurs et al. (2008) present a wonderful discussion of multiple agency 
problems as seen in the context of IPOs. The paper utilizes the multiple agency theory 
to explain underpricing in IPOs. They stress particular importance on the time horizon 
of the agents (rather than the risk propensity) and the existence of transcending 
relationships. In addition to a number of discussions relating to multiple agency theory, 
the paper examines if prior relationship of a venture capital firm with a potential 
underwriter has an impact on the degree of underpricing. Results show that previous tie 
of the VC of an IPO with the underwriter leads to higher underpricing (conflict of 
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interest). They advocate having internal board member instead of outside member, for 
e.g. from a venture capital firm. Results show lower underpricing when there is greater 
number of internal board members. Their argument is internal members provided 
monitoring protection against other agents with short term orientation (such a board 
member from a VC fund), who might appropriate value from long-term principals. The 
paper suggests that having outside directors could be detrimental to IPO firms unless the 
outsiders have substantial equity and are not tied or influenced by the VCs. 
The results from the second strand of research on universal banking present a somewhat 
different picture. There is overriding consensus on the part of the authors that conflict of 
interest does exist in a setting where venture capital funds are affiliated to underwriters. 
There is also some unanimity that markets are able to anticipate such conflicts and 
therefore exercise caution in the prices that are offered on such issues. The high degree 
of underpricing was regarding as evidence of conflict of interest anticipated by the 
market and reflected the discount for adverse selection. Evidence from US, UK, Japan 
and Germany were almost similar. While the degree of underpricing and long term 
performance are again the principal measures to examine conflict of interest, their 
interpretation differed among authors. While some authors regarded low underpricing as 
an evidence of certification hypothesis, others regarded it as evidence of conflict of 
interest (naive investor hypothesis).  In general, conflict of interest is found to have 
profound impact on the degree of underpricing while no such impact is found on the 
long term returns. Most of the papers also have reputation as a key explanatory variable. 
Reputation of both underwriters as well as venture capitalist has a big impact on the 
performance of IPOs, especially in the long term. IPOs which have prestigious 
underwriters/venture capitalist perform much better than those without such affiliations 
in the long term.  
4.2.4 Profit Sharing Allocation 
Allocation of IPOs refers to the distribution of IPOs to institutional and retail investors. 
With the popularity and widespread use of bookbuilding as an allocating mechanism 
coupled with large amount of money left on the table allocation of IPOs has become one 
of the most discussed and talked about topic in financial research. Ritter and Welch 
(2002) note that IPO share allocation is one of the most promising areas of research. 
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There have been relatively very few studies that investigate the way shares are 
allocated. Most allocation studies in the past have focussed on the distribution of shares 
among institutional and retail investors. The empirical evidence in this context, where 
the allocating mechanism has primarily been bookbuilding, is one where institutional 
investors have received preferential treatment compared to retail investors (How et al., 
2007).  
Theories on IPO allocations can be broadly grouped under three different categories.  
The academic view, pitchbook view and the profit sharing view (Nimalendran et al., 
2007). These theories primarily explain why investment banks allocate shares in a 
particular way. In other words, these theories explain who and why some investors are 
given preferential treatment and therefore receive larger allocation of IPOs than others. 
The academic view is the one posited by Benveniste and Spindt (1989) described in 
detail earlier. The pitchbook view of IPO allocation states that shares are allocated to 
those investors who are long term holders of the stock and do not engage in flipping 
activities. This view is exposited by investment banks when they make presentations to 
prospective issuers (Nimalendran et al., 2007). The profit sharing hypothesis states that 
IPO allocations are made in such a way that the investment banks share in profits made 
by investors who are allocated highly underpriced IPOs. 
One of the obvious problems associated with this kind of research is the paucity of 
allocation data as remarked by a number of authors. As such there is no such paper 
which explores huge allocation data covering a considerable time period and involving 
substantial number of underwriters. Research papers which have been included here 
either examines the proprietary allocation data of a particular investment bank (Cornelli 
and Goldreich, 2001 & Jenkinson & Jones, 2004 for example) or uses proxies to 
identify share allocations (Reuter, 2006 &  Goldstein et, al ,2007 for example). Table 17 
presents a chronological summary of the papers which have been selected for the 
review.  
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) paper is the first which brought to light evidence on 
how investment banks allocate IPOs to investors. The paper explores the driving forces 
for allocation without exploring quid pro quo relationship between the underwriter and 
investors. The primary reason for including this paper in the review is to include 
evidence on one of the hypothesis on the conflicts of interest in profit sharing allocation. 
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The paper uses a sample of 39 international equity issues brought to the market between 
1995 and 1997. These 39 issues are from 20 countries and bidders are from 60 
countries. All the issues are managed by a leading European bank. 23 out of the 39 
issues are IPOs while the remaining are secondary equity issues. Overall, the paper 
supports the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model of information extraction as the 
criteria for allocation of IPOs. Bids which are submitted early, price limited, and revised 
during the bookbuilding are given preferential treatment in terms of allocation. All these 
features of IPO bids are considered to be informative for the underwriter to gauge the 
demand in the market and therefore decide on an appropriate offer price. While regular 
investors are given preferential treatment compared to non-regular investors, they, 
however, do not earn significantly superior returns. The allocation pattern also reveals 
that the issuers/underwriters do not care much about liquidity and control as larger bids 
are favoured against smaller bids. Domestic investors are favoured against international 
investors. Moreover, the underwriter allocates shares to those investors who place bids 
through the lead underwriter rather than through other members of the syndicate. 
Although the paper do not examine quid pro quo arrangements, bias towards investors 
who bid with the lead underwriter does provide enough ground for suspicion of the 
possibility of quid pro quo arrangements between the lead underwriter and investors.  
A second paper exploring actual IPO allocation was published in 2004 by Jenkinson 
and Jones (2004). Using bid and allocation data from 27 European IPOs, the paper tests 
two alternative hypothesis: are IPOs allocated to reward investors revealing private 
information or are IPOs allocated to long term buy and hold investors. The 27 IPOs are 
issued during the period 1996-2001 in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and UK 
by a single European investment bank. Although the period of this study and that of 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) are quite similar, the results are not. In fact, the paper 
finds evidence of underwriters having a preference for long term buyers for IPO 
allocation. Using a unique tool to identify long term buy and hold buyers, the paper 
finds that long term investors (high quality) are favoured positively in heavily 
subscribed IPOs and who therefore enjoy significantly higher out-turn profits. These 
results contrast quite sharply with those of Cornelli and Goldreich (2001). While the 
main results are different, there are some similarities. Large bids, regular investors and 
bids those submitted directly to the bookrunners get better allocations. Finally, the paper  
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S.N  Paper Country Data 
Period 
Tools Utilized Evidence Underpricing 
1 Cornelli and 
Goldreich 
(2001) 
Europe & 
International 
1995-
1997 
Actual allocation data for a 
set of international IPOs 
Quid pro quo arrangements not particularly 
looked into. Allocation patterns confirm 
information extraction hypothesis.  
N/A 
2 Jenkinson & 
Jones (2004)  
Europe 1996-
2001 
Actual allocation data for 
European IPOs. 
Evidence of favouring long term buy and 
hold investor; Larger and regular investors 
preferred 
Long term investors preferred over flippers both 
in hot and cold IPOs. Larger bids and bid made to 
bookrunner given preferences in hot IPOs 
3 Reuter (2006) United States 1996-
1999 
Brokerage commission, 
mutual funds holdings 
Strong evidence of Conflict of Interest Strong positive relationship between brokerage 
commissions paid to underwriters and investors 
access to underpriced IPOs. Stronger in case of 
non-negative first day returns IPOs.  
4 Kojima, (2007)  Theoretical 
Model 
N/A Larger spreads will lead to lower underpricing and vice-versa; larger underpricing in universal banking;  
5 Nimalendran et. 
Al (2007) 
United States 1993-
2001 
Trading Volume Conflict of interest No significant increase in 
trading volume immediately prior to issue. 
Suggests low frequency commissions or high 
commissions per trade.  
  
6 Goldstein et, al 
(2007) 
United States 1999-
2002 
Institutional trading data; 
net sales by institutions in 
proxied for allocations 
Incremental brokerage commissions leading 
to preferential allocations. 
N/A 
7 Jenkinson & 
Jones (2008)  
Europe 1995-
1997 
Survey of mutual fund 
managers who regularly 
participate in IPOs 
Brokering relationship the most important 
determinant for IPO allocation; being a long 
term stockholder also beneficial; only one 
half of the II create valuation models;  
  
Table 17: Summary of the papers on Profit Sharing Allocation 
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also finds evidence of lower allocations to home investors in case of well subscribed 
IPOs are greater allocation in case of less well subscribed IPOs.   
While both the above papers look into allocations without exploring profit sharing 
between underwriter and investors, Reuter (2006) provides evidence of quid pro quo 
relationships between the two parties. The paper uses brokerage and IPO data during 
the period of 1996-1999 involving 142 unique investment banks, 1868 IPOs and 
21,912 N-SAR reports. Combining brokerage commission data with holdings of 
mutual funds, the paper finds strong correlation between brokerage commission paid 
and the holding of IPOs by mutual funds. Moreover, the relationship is strong in case 
of non-negative IPO returns and the strongest when the first reported holding of the 
mutual fund is closer to the IPO allocation, when the reported holding best reflects the 
IPO allocations minimizing the noise introduced by flipping. Results also show that 
the mutual funds are the greater beneficiaries of underpricing as the paper estimates 
that as much as 20.9 billion out of the 50.4 billion left on the table during the four 
years was received by the mutual funds. The paper also notes that while such quid pro 
quo arrangements benefit the investors and investment banks at the expense of 
issuers, there is no evidence available as to how much the issuer is harmed by such 
behaviour by investment banks.  
Similar observations were echoed from the results of a paper by Jenkinson and 
Jones, (2007). Since its publication the paper has been highly cited by researchers. 
The paper uses survey method to identify the role of investors in the underwriting 
process. There are 57 respondents from 49 investing firms, 42 mutual fund manager, 8 
chief investment officers, 5 analysts, and 2 dealers. All but 10 of the respondents are 
based in UK. Thus the paper more or less reflects the investor’s attitude in the UK. 
The most interesting finding of this paper is the huge importance given by the investor 
community to the brokering relationship with the underwriter for allocation of hot 
IPOs. Feedback from the investor community suggest that only about one half of the 
institutional investors create their own valuation model for valuing a particular IPO 
while others rely on analyst reports and the like which indicates that the investor are 
not too keen on information production. Bidding characteristics of the investors also 
differ according to the subscription level of the IPO. For cold IPOs investors typically 
make limit bids while price sensitive and strike bids are employed in the case of hot 
IPOs. Limits bids made by the investors are usually below their valuation levels and 
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this difference increases if the investor feels that the issue will not be well subscribed. 
This casts doubt as to whether the lead underwriter is able to infer market demand and 
the true value of the IPO from the information revealed through bidding of informed 
investors and therefore a question mark over the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) model. 
Moreover, being regular and long term investors are also thought to be important by 
the investor for being allocated IPOs.      
Kojima (2007) presents some empirical implications from her theoretical model. The 
paper observes the potential conflict of interest faced by an underwriter in a 
bookbuilding mechanism. With discretion in allocation the underwriter is always 
faced with an option of siding with the investors to the detriment of the issuers. The 
paper therefore suggest that the reduction of the underwriting spread is not in the 
interest of the issuer as it will force the underwriter to side with the investors and seek 
rents through excessive underpricing. The paper also makes a number of empirical 
predictions: larger spreads will lead to small underpricing (negative relationship); 
underwriter with more affiliates or a bigger asset management division will lead to 
higher underpricing (universal banking); underpricing more significant in small IPOs 
than large ones; firms with lower uncertainty rely more on spread to compensate 
underwriters whereas firms with higher uncertainty should compensate underwriters 
through large underpricing. 
Assuming the existence of conflict of interest (referring to Reuter, 2006) and that 
investors enter into quid pro quo relationships with underwriters, Nimalendran et al., 
(2007) investigate how such payments are made. Specifically, they examine whether 
it is through high frequency trading activity near the IPO date or systematic payments 
over a period of time. The paper refers to such trading as “IPO related trading, and 
determines it by examining the trading volume of the 50 most actively traded liquid 
stocks 20 days prior to an IPO. Their sample consists of 3,499 IPOs over the 1993-
2001 period. Moreover, they partition their sample into three sub-periods: pre-internet 
bubble, internet bubble period and post internet bubble period. Results shows that 
explicit profit sharing agreements is not done on an ex-post basis since the money left 
on the table on the day before the current day has no significant impact on the trading 
volume of the current day. Results show that for each additional $1 billion in IPO 
profitability there is an additional $656,410 in commissions generated (assuming 
$0.10 commission per share). During the internet bubble the trading volumes of the 
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50 most liquid stocks increased by 2.04% per day over the 6 days prior to the IPO. 
Since these stocks account for about 25% of the total volume, money left on the table 
accounts for only about 0.5% increase in trading volume. Although the increase in 
trading volume in other sub-periods are also positive they are, however, statistically 
insignificant. Since the increase in trading volume is negligible, the authors suggest 
that the flow of payback to underwriters may have occurred over a longer period of 
time or through higher commission per trade and not through increase in trading 
volume.  
The final paper to be reviewed in this section is a working paper by Goldstein et al., 
(2007). The paper presents some interesting empirical evidence on IPO allocation and 
brokerage commissions. Their sample consists of 769 IPOs during the 1999-2001 
period and carried out over an 812 trading day period. It sets up an interaction 
between short term and long term investors in terms of IPO allocation and the factors 
that determines allocation among these two groups of investors. The paper also 
examines the modes of brokerage payments made to underwriters by investors to get 
preferential allocation of IPOs. The major data for the paper comes from the 
Abel/Nooser database which provides institutional trading data of a total of 609 
different institutional investors. Lacking actual allocation data, the paper utilizes the 
net sales data immediately after the IPO as a proxy for allocations.  
Set during the hot IPOs market of late 1990s, the paper finds empirical evidence of 
incremental brokerage payments in the case of hot IPOs. The paper estimates that 
approximately $1.7 million of additional commission per IPO was received by the 
lead underwriter in the 10 days period immediately preceding the most profitable 
IPOs (IPOs in the 4th quartile in terms of profitability). The payment of this 
additional brokerage commissions is, however, negatively related to the concentration 
of underwriter's client base i.e. the larger the long term investors of the underwriter 
the lower is the incremental commission received by the underwriter and vice-versa. 
Test conducted by the authors does not seem to reveal any particular preferences on 
the part of the investors to direct commission to underwriters. The authors suggest 
that investors might be using a combination of incremental commission per trade, 
trade size and number of trades to compensate the underwriters. Results also indicate 
that the long term and short term investors interact differently with the lead 
underwriter to receive allocations of hot IPOs. While the long term investors use their 
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consistent payment of brokerage commissions over a period of time as the tool for 
IPO allocations, short term investors direct incremental commissions prior to IPO 
allocation to receive preferential treatment. Results also show that significant part of 
the money left on the table from underpriced IPOs is captured by investors, both long 
term as well as short term investors. $1 of abnormal commission revenue sent by 
short-term institutions to the lead underwriter generates $4.28 in IPO profits from 
allocated shares. Finally, the authors suggest that favouring the short term investors 
might have been a one off event during the internet bubble period and argue that in 
more normal conditions allocation of IPOs would normally be determined by the 
length of the relationship that investors have with the investment banks.      
Review of the papers above does provide enough ground for suspicion that investment 
banks might be involved in quid pro quo relationships with the investors. Reuter 
(2006) and Goldstein et al. (2007) provide evidence of the same. However, it must be 
noted that both the studies utilized proxies rather that actual allocation data. Through 
the use of survey, Jenkinson and Jones (2007) show that it could be a global 
phenomenon and not just exclusive to the US. Apart from this survey there is no 
evidence of profit sharing allocation from United Kingdom, continental Europe or 
emerging markets. Emerging markets such as China, India and Russia have not only 
been at the centre of hectic IPO activity but also witnessed some of the highly 
underpriced issues in recent times which serve as a catalyst to forge unholy alliances 
with investors at the expense of issuers.   
Another point worth noting is the data period of these studies. The studies have 
utilized data until the end with the bubble period and there is no evidence on the 
behaviour of the investment banks post 2000. It would be interesting to observe 
whether the banks changed their behaviour or maintained the status quo in light of a 
number of laws and rules that were forced as a consequence of the burst of the 
internet bubble. Although IPO activity post internet bubble declined significantly, it 
has certainly picked up since 2004.6 There is also ambiguity as to how investment 
banks derive rent from the investors. The studies have not been able to show clearly 
how and through what mechanisms investment banks take their share of profits from 
highly underpriced IPOs. Finally, none of the papers have systematically examined 
the effects of quid pro quo relationship on the issuers. While underpricing is definitely 
                                                 
6 Source: Dealogic, Thomson Financial, Ernst & Young 
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not beneficial to the issuers a more thorough analysis is required to isolate the damage 
the relationship brings to the issuer.  
4.2.5 Allocations to Affiliated Funds 
A potential source of conflict of interest for investment bankers arises when they 
allocate IPOs to affiliated funds. Numerous investment banking groups operate 
mutual funds. These mutual funds, in turn, are investors of IPOs which are managed 
by their investment banking arm. In the US during the period 1990-2001, 60 out of 
the 361 investments who were lead underwriters had affiliated mutual funds (Ritter 
and Zhang, 2007). With large amount of money left on the table coupled with the 
reputation of the investment bank at stake, managers of affiliated mutual funds could 
be under pressure to buy IPOs written by their investment banking arm. Dietz and 
Henkoff (2004) report that mutual funds affiliated with large investment banks, 
including Citigroup, Credit Suisse First Boston, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and 
Morgan Stanley, invested heavily in their client stocks while other institutional 
investors were reducing holdings on these stocks amid performance concerns.  
When faced with such a scenario, the investment banking group has three factors to 
consider (Ritter and Zhang, 2007): 
(a) The underwriting spread: the underwriting fee would lead the investment bank to 
allocate shares of weak IPO to its affiliated funds 
(b) Commission paybacks: In case of hot/underpriced IPOs, allocating them to 
unaffiliated funds would result in profit sharing through directed commissions (as 
discussed above) 
(c) Fund performance: Investment banks can improve the performance of affiliated 
mutual funds by allocating them hot IPOs and therefore attract money in those funds.  
The first two factors will generally lead the investment bank to allocate only cold 
IPOs to affiliated funds while the third factor makes the investment bank act 
otherwise. It is the balance between and interplay of these three factors that ultimately 
decides the allocation of IPOs to affiliated funds. Ritter and Zhang (2007) present two 
alternative hypotheses explaining the allocation of IPOs to affiliated funds: 
(a) Nepotism hypothesis: It refers to the situation whereby underpriced IPOs are allocated 
to affiliated funds. The purpose is to improve the performance of the funds, attract 
money inflows and subsequently earn higher management fees.  
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(b) Dumping hypothesis: it refers to the situation whereby investment banks allocate cold 
IPOs to their affiliated mutual funds in order to support weak aftermarket demand so 
as to maintain and enhance their underwriting business.  
It is not necessary that a particular investment bank always follows a particular course 
of action; one hypothesis might be preferred at a particular time, while at some other 
time a different course of action might be undertaken. The course of action will be 
influenced by the market condition. In cold IPO markets dumping hypothesis and in 
hot IPO markets nepotism hypothesis markets might be more prevalent. Ritter and 
Zhang (2007) paraphrase  Karceski (2002) “underwriter would allocate more hot 
IPOs to its affiliated funds when the overall expected first day return of IPOs is high 
and attracting money inflows for the affiliated funds is most important, because of the 
greater performance-funds flow sensitivity that exists in bull markets.”  
Table 18 presents a summary of the paper selected for review under affiliated 
allocation.  
The first paper to systematically explore allocations by investment banks to affiliated 
funds is Ber et al., (2001). Using a sample of 120 Israeli IPOs issued during 1991-
1994 the paper addresses potential conflicts of interest when investment bank group 
also manage mutual funds. The study utilizes both the short term underpricing and 
long run operating performance measures to examine conflicts of interest. On the 
basis of post issue accounting returns, the paper presents no evidence of any conflict 
of interest when there is an affiliation between mutual funds to which the issue is 
allocated by managing underwriter. Results show that there are potential for conflict 
of interest when the lending, underwriting and mutual fund management all fall under 
one roof. Although the number of IPOs in this group is fairly small (only seven IPOs 
in this case), IPOs of firms which are managed by a lending underwriter and which 
are allocated to affiliated mutual funds exhibit highly negative and significant excess 
returns during the first year (-32.3%) as well as negative first day returns. In other 
words mutual funds managed by the investment bank pay high price for the IPOs 
managed by the affiliated investment bank at the expense of mutual fund investor.  
Ritter and Zhang (2007) present empirical evidence of allocation of IPOs by 
investment banks to affiliated mutual funds. Their sample consists of 2,257 IPOs 
issued during the period 1990-2001 by investment banks which had affiliated mutual 
funds. Out of the 2,257 IPOs, 283 of them were allocated to affiliated mutual funds. 
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Study Country Data 
Period  
Dumping/ 
Nepotism 
Underpricing Long-term Performance 
1 Ber et al., 
(2001) 
Israel 1991-
1994 
Dumping  IPOs firm perform poorly in first 
day when they are underwritten 
by lender bank and which are 
allocated to affiliated mutual 
funds. 
IPOs firm perform poorly one year 
after the issue when they are 
underwritten by lender bank and 
which are allocated to affiliated 
mutual funds. 
2 Reuter, 
(2006) 
United 
States 
1996-
1999 
None Neither dumping nor nepotism 
hypothesis. Inconclusive 
evidence. 
N/A 
3 Ritter and 
Zhang, 
(2007) 
United 
States 
1990-
2001 
Mixed 
Evidence 
1999-2000-evidence of nepotism; 
1990-1994 & 1995-1996 mild 
evidence of dumping hypothesis  
No difference in performance 
4 Johnson 
and 
Marietta-
Westberg, 
(2005) 
United 
States 
1993-
1998 
Mixed 
Evidence 
Use of purchases and sales to 
examine conflict of interest. 
Purchases does indicate quid pro 
quo hypothesis. However, higher 
returns also signal exploitation of 
informational advantage. 
Performance indicates underwriters 
use institutional funds to improve 
underwriting business (quid pro quo 
hypothesis). However, performance 
of such institutional funds better than 
non-underwriters indicating superior 
information flow. 
Table 18: Summary of Papers of Allocations to Affiliated Funds 
The paper addresses the growing scepticism on the part of investors and regulators on 
the activities of underwriters especially after the burst of the dot come bubble. This 
paper also addresses concerns over the one-stop banking services, now allowed in the 
US after the repeal of the Glass-Steagal act of 1933. The primary issue that the paper 
tackles is whether affiliated mutual funds are used by investment banks as a place to 
dump cold IPOs ( at the expense of the large number of mutual funds shareholders) or 
are they allocated hot IPOs so as to boost fund performance and thereby extract larger 
management fees. The paper notes a steady increase in the allocation of IPOs to 
affiliated mutual funds. While less than 10% IPOs were allocated to affiliated mutual 
funds during 1990-1996, approximately 30% of the IPOs were allocated to affiliated 
funds in 1999-2001. However, on average only 0.6% of the shares issued are held by 
affiliated mutual funds at the first reporting date. 
In univariate results, the average initial returns of IPOs which are allocated to 
affiliated mutual funds is 54.4%, almost 29% above the average initial return of 
25.8% of other IPOs from those underwriters which have affiliated mutual funds but 
didn't allocate IPOs to them. The result is consistent when the total sample period is 
Conflicts of Interest in IPOs: Case of Investment Banks 
 
68 | P a g e  
 
divided into segments to account for hot and cold markets. Except for the sub-period 
2001, initial returns of IPOs which are allocated to affiliated mutual funds are higher 
than those which are not allocated (1990-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, 1999-2000). 
Thus the univariate comparisons seem to support the nepotism hypothesis. In 
multivariate results, the nepotism hypothesis is not so convincing. Only for the period 
1999-2000 is the initial returns of IPOs allocated to affiliated funds statistically higher 
than of IPOs which are not allocated. For all other sub-periods the results are 
statistically insignificant. Results are similar when the paper utilizes price adjustment, 
a measure of expected underpricing, as the dependent variable instead of actual 
underpricing to account for any endogeniety problems. The paper finds some 
evidence (mild) of dumping hypothesis when analysing only IPOs which were 
involved in large allocations to affiliated mutual funds. Initial returns are 12% lower 
when a large allocation is made to affiliated mutual funds during the period 1995-
1996. Similarly, during 1990-1994 initial returns are 10% lower for IPOs which have 
a large allocation to affiliated mutual funds. In terms of long term performance there 
is no difference between the two groups of IPOs. 
 Reuter’s (2006) paper which has already been introduced in the profit sharing 
allocation section also address the issue of allocation to affiliated mutual funds. In his 
statistical test the coefficient on the affiliated mutual funds dummy is not significantly 
different from zero indicating such funds neither received disproportionately larger or 
fewer IPO allocation compared to other funds. With respect to brokerage commission 
and IPO allocation, the coefficient on the affiliated mutual fund is negative and 
statistically significant which means that the affiliated funds earn slightly lower first 
day returns on IPOs than the level of their brokerage commission payments to the 
affiliated underwriter would predict. This would mean that underwriter neither dump 
nor favour affiliated mutual funds. 
Using aftermarket sales and purchases by institutional funds, either affiliated to 
underwriter or not, Johnson and Marietta-Westberg, (2005) examine the conflict of 
interest in a setting which includes investment banking and asset management. The 
paper, however, does not use underpricing to examine conflicts of interest. The paper 
tests two hypotheses: the quid-pro Quo (dumping) and the superior information 
hypothesis (nepotism). The former posits that underwriters will use their affiliated 
institutional funds to improve underwriting business, while the later posits that 
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superior information will be passed on to the affiliated funds to earn higher returns. 
Using a time frame of 8 quarters after an IPO, the study finds that stock holding of 
IPOs by affiliated funds is statistically higher than holdings of IPOs by unaffiliated 
institutions (1.2% vs 0.9% of shares outstanding). In univariate results the study also 
finds that non-underwriter institutional holders are on average momentum traders 
while underwriters are not. Non-underwriter institutions purchase stocks when they 
have gone up by 3.4% in the previous quarter while underwriters purchase their own 
IPOs after a statistically insignificant previous quarterly return of 0.9%. This evidence 
lends support to the quid-pro quo hypothesis. A further evidence of the first 
hypothesis is the selling behaviour of underwriters who sell their holdings in the 
quarter in which they have initiated analyst coverage or have underwritten firm's 
SEO. Such behaviour is not seen with non-underwriters. Moreover, IPO underwriters 
also differ in their behavior from non underwriters in case of SEOs. While all types of 
investors are involved in purchasing stocks prior to a SEO, it is only the underwriter 
firm which liquidates SEO again consistent with quid pro quo hypothesis. In 
multivariate analysis using probit regression the paper presents evidence of selling 
stocks by underwriters (affiliated) once they initiate a service like analyst coverage. 
Such behaviour is not present in non-underwriters.  
In order to find the link between the behaviour described above and the benefits to 
underwriter, the paper utilizes probit model. They find that higher initiating analyst 
coverage and holding higher levels of stock subsequent to the IPO are rewarded by 
future business with the firm in the form of SEO underwriting. Regression analysis 
using future quarterly excess returns shows that underwriter is able to earn a 
statistically significant return of 7.7% higher than non-underwriter over 8 quarters 
after an IPO. Furthermore, underwriters without analyst coverage have a statistically 
significant return of 1.78% after underwriter large purchases. However, when there is 
analyst coverage, the underwriter does not make any significant returns. SEO 
underwriters, however, are not able to make significant returns on their purchases. On 
the basis of the results the authors conclude that while underwriters do make use of 
institutional funds to improve their investment banking business, they are also able to 
generate higher returns for their investors because of their informational advantage. 
With the repeal of the Glass-Steagal act of 1933, the debate over universal banking 
has intensified. With investment banks becoming even more powerful coupled with 
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huge funds available to mutual funds and other institutional investors, the regulators 
and the investor community is interested to see whether the interest of the small 
investors are protected by these large, powerful players in the financial markets. As 
such a few important papers, reviewed above, examined the role of investment banks 
in allocating IPO to their affiliated funds. The evidence at the moment cannot be 
considered as conclusive. Ber et al. (2001) and Reuter (2006) find no evidence of 
either favouring or dumping affiliated mutual funds by investment banks while Ritter 
and Zhang (2007) find some evidence of nepotism during the internet bubble period. 
Johnson and Marietta-Westberg, (2005) on the other hand find evidence of both. 
Again all the three studies have used data only until the internet bubble period which 
was characterised by very high initial returns prompting either nepotism or dumping 
behaviour on the part of the investment bank. There is a great need to not only have 
more evidence on this universal banking debate post the internet bubble period but 
also from countries other than US. Moreover, in terms of affiliated institution the 
some evidence is available on for mutual funds. Hedge funds are also very powerful 
institutional investors to whom IPOs are allocated. An examination of the influence 
they make in IPO allocations could be very interesting.     
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5 Chapter Five: Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
Financial intermediaries are special businesses. They are pivotal for the efficient 
functioning of the financial markets. However, problems in financial intermediation can 
trigger external costs evident from the recent credit crises. The crises can spill over to 
other segments and therefore paralyzing the economy. Financial markets across the 
world are integrated as never before and financial crisis in one country has the potential 
to influence the global economy. Moreover, in recent times financial intermediaries 
have undergone massive changes and have become much more complicated. The 
complication has also doubled with a large range of financial securities and services 
available. In light of this, it becomes very important to closely examine how financial 
intermediaries function not only to protect the investor community but also to avoid 
large scale financial crises. Such examinations will also be helpful to the financial 
intermediaries themselves as it will instil confidence in investor and regulators.   
This particular review was aimed at exploring conflicts of interest in initial public 
offerings (IPOs) perpetuated by investment banks. Since the burst of the internet 
bubble, which witnessed incredible levels of underpricing, there has been great interest 
in the way investment banks conduct themselves in the IPO process particularly with 
respect to allocations. With bookbuilding mechanism pricing and allocations have 
become completely discretionary in the hands of the investment banks. Bookbuilding 
has now become the most dominant form of IPO allocation mechanism all over the 
world. Through the scoping study we identified five different themes on conflicts of 
interest in which investment banks could further their own interest at the expense of 
investors and/or issuers: laddering, spinning, relationship banking, profit sharing 
allocations and affiliated allocations. These themes were identified with the framework 
specified in the review objectives.  
Results presented in chapter 4 show that there is not a great deal of literature exploring 
the themes that we identified. Except for relationship banking, evidence on all other 
themes can be regarded as very limited. One obvious problem with research related in 
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this area has been the lack of publicly available data. Except for relationship banking, 
all other themes have examined conflict of interest using proxies.   
Papers included under profit sharing allocation, laddering, affiliated allocation and 
spinning all provide evidence of conflicts of interest by investment bank. These 
problems were found to be acute during the interest bubble period when there was a lot 
of financial stake. In fact a large majority of the papers focus their study during this 
internet bubble period. Although there was speculation that investors and investment 
banks had quid pro quo relationship over IPO allocation, it was not until Reuter (2006) 
that we had any substantial evidence to prove it. Reuter’s (2006) robust analysis 
provides quite convincing evidence that links ‘IPO related trading’ commissions to IPO 
allocations. This evidence was further corroborated by Goldstein et, al (2007) whereby 
they provided evidence of incremental brokerage commission influencing allocation of 
IPOs by investment banks. 
In terms of allocation to affiliated funds (mainly mutual funds), there is no clear 
evidence at the moment. While Reuter (2006) didn’t find any evidence supporting either 
dumping or nepotism hypothesis, Ritter & Zhang (2007) did find nepotism at least in 
the internet bubble period. Johnson & Marietta-Westberg’s (2005) paper has some 
mixed evidence. While the purchasing and sales pattern of affiliated mutual funds do 
point towards quid pro quo relationships, performance of affiliated mutual funds over 
time also indicates that the close association was used to generate better results for 
mutual funds.  
Evidence from papers under laddering and spinning, however, clearly suggests that 
investment bank do enter into relationship with investors for their own benefit and at the 
expense of the issuers. Evidence from papers under the relationship banking theme has 
mixed results. There seems to be support for certification hypothesis when underwriters 
affiliated to commercial banks issue IPOs. Lower underpricing seen in these IPOs is 
taken as evidence for reduction in information asymmetry with the involvement of 
commercial banks. Papers which have explored the affiliation of investment banks and 
venture capital funds, however, conclude differently. Most of the papers in this strand 
conclude that such relationship have the potential to exploit investors which is 
anticipated by the market. Reputation of both the underwriters and venture capitalist 
does seem to influence both short term and long term performance. 
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5.2 Discussions and Research Directions 
5.2.1 Discussions 
In spite of a very well developed volume of literature, review of the papers indicate that 
there is still great scope to research on IPOs especially with respect to pricing and 
allocation. Continued interest partially stems from the lack of publicly available data 
and therefore calls for ingenuity and skill on the part of the researchers to uncover 
truths. Although the level of IPO activity dipped following the burst of the internet 
bubble, it has regained very high activity levels since 2004. There are certain 
observations that demand attention from the academic community.  First, there is almost 
no evidence on the issues discussed post internet bubble period. Since conflicts of 
interest was assumed to be very high during the internet bubble period most of the 
studies cover that particular period. However, it is also equally important to see how 
things have changed after the crises and the impact of new legislations on the behaviour 
of investment banks.  
Second, almost all of the papers have exclusively focussed on United States. Barring a 
few papers on relationship banking there is practically no evidence available from 
United Kingdom, Continental Europe or Emerging Markets. While US has been the 
centre of hectic IPO activity over a long period of time, IPOs is other parts of the world 
have increased tremendously. One of the factors that lead to conflicts of interest was the 
huge amount of money (high underpricing) left on the table during the internet bubble 
period. The degree of underpricing in emerging markets is much higher than US. 
Evidence of conflicts of interest in US begs us to explore how investment banks price 
and allocate IPOs in other countries. Any evidence in these areas will definitely enrich 
the IPO literature.  
Third, Papers on affiliated allocations and profit sharing allocations do provide evidence 
of quid pro quo relationships between investment banks and investors. These 
relationships have shown to benefit both investment banks and investors. However, no 
systematic evidence is available on the impact of such relationships on issuers. While a 
high degree of underpricing might not be in the interest of the issuers, the extent to 
which such relationships harm the issuers remain to be explored (Reuter, 2006).  
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Fourth, most of the studies have examined conflict of interest by measuring the initial 
and long term stock performance returns. Some have used issue costs, changes in the 
filing range, actual allocation data, data on brokerage commission, data on purchases 
and sales by lead underwriter clients. It is important to identify proper measures and 
even more important to interpret them properly to arrive at appropriate conclusions. 
Interpretation of initial return (underpricing) has been subject to variation. Since the 
interpretation of initial returns is ambiguous it is necessary to supplement it with some 
other measures to convincingly put forward the argument. This could be done by the use 
of other financial and/or accounting data.   
5.2.2 Research Directions 
My research agenda follows from the discussion above. The lack of evidence outside of 
US has prompted me to examine conflict of interest in countries other than US. The aim 
is to acquire some evidence from a mix of developed and emerging markets. In the 
context of UK, for example, there are only three papers which have dealt with the issues 
that I am interested in UK. Espenlaub et al. (1999) paper on relationship banking was 
published way back in 1999 using even prior data. Jenkinson and Jones (2004) provide 
some evidence on allocation of European companies without investigating quid pro quo 
relationships. Jenkinson and Jones (2007) survey paper further highlights the need to 
examine allocations as brokering relationship was identified as one of the most 
important factor in determining allocation of IPOs. There is no evidence available in 
UK on profit sharing allocation, allocation to affiliated funds, laddering, spinning and 
relationship banking (commercial bank affiliated underwriters). Same is the case with 
emerging markets like China and India.   
Secondly, my research will focus on examining the behaviour of investment banks post 
internet bubble. Increased media coverage and scrutiny from the regulators have been 
witnessed in the recent past seeking additional regulations on financial intermediaries. 
Regulations are not always effective and efficient and sometimes undermine the 
efficiency of the capital markets. The Financial and Services Authority (FSA) regulates 
the IPO in UK. In wake of the spinning and laddering scandals in the US, FSA 
conducted its own investigation and didn’t find any evidence. A consultation paper 
titled “Conflicts of Interest:  Investment Research and Issues of Securities” was 
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published by the FSA in October 2003. Examining post internet bubble data I will 
attempt to identify the effectiveness of introduced regulations and/or the need to have 
further regulations as advocated by Kanatas and Qi (1998).   
The recent success of Alternative Investment Market (AIM) in United Kingdom has 
caught the attention of everyone by establishing itself as the world’s leading stock 
market for young companies. At a time when major stock exchanges have witnessed 
decline in listing, AIM (UK), Growth Enterprise Market (Hong Kong), Market of 
Alternative Investment, MAI (Thailand) and a number of other smaller stock exchanges 
have been successful in attractive new issues. A report commissioned by the London 
Stock Exchange and conducted by Geoffrey Owen, Julia Black and Sridhar Arcot finds 
that AIM has been successful in attracting both British and Foreign companies7. Among 
other things the paper finds distinctive regulation, broad market profile and strong after-
market performance as the key to its success. Most of the issuers in these smaller 
exchanges are small and growing companies and are attracted to it because of its less 
stringent listing requirements.  
The discussions earlier in the findings did bring to light the influence of underwriter and 
venture capital reputation in mitigating conflicts of interest. It would be very interesting 
to examine the impact of reputation in a smaller investment market like AIM. Have 
investors demanded greater discount on IPOs on AIM or has the reputation of 
underwriter and/or venture capitalists provided certification so as to reduce information 
asymmetry? Answers to issues like these could contribute significantly to understanding 
of IPOs issued in smaller platforms like AIM.          
As mentioned earlier, there is a dearth of publicly available data on these issues. The 
challenge will be to identify proxies and make appropriate use of them. It should also be 
borne in mind that the IPO process in Europe and Emerging markets is different to that 
in the US. This will invariably lead to number of variables and factors to take account 
of. This will be next steps in the PhD process.  
                                                 
7 Study Entitled: “From Local to Global – The rise of AIM as a stock market for growing companies”. 
Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/pressAndInformationOffice/newsAndEvents/archives/2007/AIMStudy.htm 
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5.3 Limitations and Learning Experience 
With its rigour, transparency, comprehensiveness, and auditability the systematic 
review goes a long way in conducting a robust and scientific review of studies in a 
particular area of research. It also provides a great deal of confidence to the researcher 
as the whole process in very scientific. The use of protocol limits the biases of the 
researchers and helps in presenting a more objective research. Furthermore, it also 
brings to the knowledge of the researcher the potential areas where s/he uses own 
subjectivity and the need to be cautions. In spite of the checks in place systematic 
review does have some limitations which need to be discussed.  
The first limitation comes from the way the search strategy was built. It was not 
possible to include all the journal databases and the focus was more in financial 
literature. There could have some discussion on the topics of interest in some other 
literature such as law which were ignored. From the vast list of results, studies were 
initially screened from their titles. This also has the potential to miss out some studies 
which might be related to the research themes as titles sometimes do not reflect the 
nature of the contents.      
The researcher’s bias very much comes into play during the use of quality appraisal 
criteria. While quality appraisal criteria were set up through a comprehensive discussion 
with supervisor and other panel members, application of those criteria is purely 
subjective at the disposal of the researcher. While this can be a problem for even a 
seasoned researcher it becomes an even bigger problem for a novice researcher like us. 
Since we do not possess a great deal of knowledge such subjective bias can definitely 
undermine the conclusions of the paper. 
Conflicts of interest in IPOs have caught the attention of researchers recently and 
therefore the body of literature is not very comprehensive. This has lead me to include 
some papers which were not of a very good quality in terms of methodology and 
analysis in order to reflect the range of discussions currently going on. Similar in the 
case when working papers are include in the review. While including them does have 
the advantage of getting up to date with the debates it does have the its own limitations 
in terms of quality. 
On the whole the systematic review has been one incredible journey. It has exposed me 
to the rigours of research and nicely set up for what will be a very exciting and 
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challenging PhD program. Interactions with my supervisor, members of the consultation 
panel and with peers provided great impetus during the whole process. The Systematic 
review has also provided me with additional confidence to go ahead with my research 
interests as there are a number of outstanding issues that needs to be addressed by the 
academic community. It has also helped me to position my research properly by 
locating gaps in the literature.         
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